Leadership Vacuum

The piecemeal approach to address the continuing and worsening financial and growth crises has exposed the biggest missing element – leadership.  There is none and it is an international problem.  The Swiss are in panic mode and need to prevent any further strengthening of their currency;  the ECB is floundering  trying one solution after another – the most recent is the purchase of Italian and Spanish bonds; the US is doing little to nothing when it needs revenues and its tax rates are the lowest in history because its political structure is in a state of collapse – and S&P placed the blame at the feet of the Republicans and their moronic  tea party core; European tax payers – and more to the point German taxpayers – are being asked to absorb Euro debt of the peripheral Eurozone members when the problem is structural economic imbalance.  The political will to do anything, apparently anywhere, is zero.  As I write this, the Dow dropped 200 points in 2 minutes.

If Europe keeps using band aids rather than addressing its structural problems, then the Euro is in deep trouble and, with nationalism on the rise, so is the EU.  If the tea party and Republicans are not removed from the table, then the US moves closer still to banana republic status.

Trouble is no longer on the horizon – it’s in full view.

Economic problems are structural and long-term coordinated plans are required.  There is no magic bullet and everything short-term has been tried. In the US, raising taxes and spending on infrastructure and science are required – in other words, spending.  In Europe, a little introspection and planning regarding the economic imbalances between the core and the rest must be undertaken. What is missing is leadership. Leadership would inspire confidence, also in short supply. But, in Europe and particularly in the US, waiting for leadership is like waiting for Godot.

By the way, for those involved in donor oriented development programs, watch the money dry up.

Don't Park Illegally in Vilnius

OK.  This is priceless.  The photo shows the mayor of Vilnius, Arturas Zuokas, crushing an illegally parked car (in a bike lane). Apparently he lost his patience and a ticket and tow was simply not going to cut it.

Crescent Rising - Part 2

Image via Wikipedia

From its very beginning with the capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire became European or at least, non-Asian – only more far more enlightened compared to its contemporary competition further west in Spain, England and France.  This was not a matter of choice, but practicality.  Everyone it conquered to the west of Constantinople was not Turkish and non-Muslim.  To make the empire functional, these people were needed (with enthusiasm), so the practical Ottomans simply made them part of a rich, open society and, aside from requiring these regional governments to pay taxes to Istanbul and defer on all issues of foreign and military policy, they were pretty much left on their own.  It worked remarkably well for 300 years. And it was not until the mid-18^th century, when the long, 200 year retreat from Europe began, that the cosmopolitan and European attitudes began to erode, ending completely in 1918. 

Almost a century later, the Turks are again learning how to be internationalists, Europeans and powerful.  They’ve gotten a little rusty at it.  The major difference is that now, Islam, a political religion pushed aside since 1922 with the founding of the modern Turkish state, must be taken into consideration by any government in Ankara.  This is something Europe has conveniently forgotten and, in the great Casablanca tradition are “shocked, shocked” that there are Muslims in Turkey.  To be fair, many Turks are also surprised and shocked and despite Western fears, the secularists in Turkey are not an inconsiderable force so all the talk about the AKP turning Turkey into a fundamentalist Islamic state (like the Wests great ally, Saudi Arabia), is absurd.  There are no Wahhabists in Ankara – the AKP want to rule, not get run out of town.

The view from Ankara, as promulgated by the current party in power, is – to use its own term – 360 degrees.  Turkey’s strategy is its “zero conflict with neighbors” policy - to be friends with everyone and enemies of none. Turkey is playing a game now that it has not played in over 100 years.  It wants to normalize relations with Armenia, except the government in Baku (Muslim and a Turkic culture) wants its support over Nagorno-Karabakh.  Syria wants its support in Lebanon.  Iran wants its support against the US. Even the Saudi’s want Turkish support against Iran and the US wants Turkey back in a subservient mode. The neighbourhood is, to put it mildly, a rough one and because all these countries have different, if not competing interests, the zero conflict with neighbours’ policy is not sustainable.  Sooner or later, Turkey will have to choose sides on some issues and make someone very, very unhappy.  Ankara seems to understand this ultimate fact and has been exercising its rediscovered power carefully.  For example, if the AKP government had rejected the NATO anti-missile bases directed at Iran the damage in the EU, US and NATO would have been terminal; realpolitik kicked in and they accepted the missiles rather than break with the West over Iran – a regional competitor in any event.  Tehran was, as expected, less than pleased.  I suspect the attitude in Ankara toward Iran on this matter was “get over it”.

Turkish views of their sudden international problems are kept close and rarely discussed openly – despite the Prime Minister’s unfortunate predilection for less than diplomatic comments.  Turkey has deep economic interests in the Muslim world – which delayed its denunciation of Qaddafi, for example – as well as very significant interests in Syria and Iran.  It is not going to jettison these for the benefit of Washington or Israel or Berlin for that matter. Turkey wants a stable Syria and no air attacks on Iran.  It also understands the need not to confront Russia for the same reason Germany has become Moscow’s foot pad – energy.  Despite the increasingly tepid support by Ankara for EU membership, even this is likely a charade as Germany and France increasingly pursue a policy of exclusion.  On the other hand, given the problems in the EU which are not simply monetary, perhaps Ankara is following the old Groucho Marx dictum of never joining a club that would have him as a member.

Turkey knows it has the most robust and capable military force in the region.  The economy has continued to grow at a startling rate of over 8% - something not seen in Europe in a very long time. Although this growth will moderate, and is now showing signs of strain, the fact is that the Turks are beginning to punch their weight, economically and culturally in the region and have recently taken the lead in representing Islam and democracy – something many in the West feel is impossible.  They tread carefully, however, because there is increasing talk of the Ottomanization of the state and the memory of empire for both Turkey and in the capitals of its former holdings in the region has not vanished.  Whatever government sits in Ankara, this memory will influence future actions.

Finally, Turkey’s relationship with the US and Israel has suffered recently.  But, from Ankara s point of view, the relationships are now on a more equal footing regionally.  The US needs Turkey as it leaves Iraq and for the influence it holds in the Caucuses and Central Asia.  Israel, despite the Gaza flotilla incident and a general souring of relations with Turkey under the Netanyahu regime, remains on economic and military speaking terms. Israel cannot afford to make Turkey an enemy. Ankara also knows – and the US knows it knows (we all know) - that Israel has no capability to achieve any sort of political movement in Syria, Lebanon or Iran of the type that Turkey can achieve.  Turkey, in other words, has options.

As a rising regional power, Turkey can no longer play with neat little academic concepts.  Culturally, they may not want to deal with regional problems by choosing sides or playing realpolitik – but these are consequences of their re-emergence.  Turkey is a player in the new old order and they will grow into the role, as they must.

Crescent Rising - Part 1

Image via Wikipedia

First, a thimbleful of background, as this is not meant to detail the complexities of the rise of the Turkish state but establish their parallax view.
Back in the not so distant past, Turkey towed the line.  As a subservient, reliable partner of the West during the Cold War, Turkey could be counted on to do and say whatever NATO and the US wanted.  Of course, the new nation, founded only in 1922 after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent revolution led by Kamal Ataturk, was less than 25 years old when the Cold War started.   Ataturk, of course, pulled Turkey abruptly into the West and moved its capital from imperial Constantinople to the somewhat desolate Ankara in the center of the Anatolian plateau.  In the process, he stripped away the old imperial trappings and mindset which had brought the Ottomans in on the wrong side of the war, albeit with the significant encouragement of Allied incompetence and, not to put too fine a point on it, British arrogance, adeptly exploited by Berlin.

After the end of the Second World War, during which the new nation of Turkey intelligently remained a neutral, the government – out of historical habit and national interests – moved even closer to the West and became the southern bulwark against the equally new Russian empire now called the Soviet Union.   Turkish foreign policy, dictated by its generals, became whatever NATO and hence US foreign policy, needed it to be.  That was the view from Ankara then.

I suspect one can look to the events of the early 1970s when this easy relationship began to go off the rails in Cyprus as far as Ankara was concerned.  Between 1960 and 1974, Cyprus was a unified republic composed of a Greek majority and Turkish minority, mostly located in the north.  When Greek nationalists began to agitate for annexation by Greece, and complemented their desires with attacks on the Turkish minority (who retaliated at times, but were significantly outnumbered), Ankara became understandably concerned.  Then came the military coup in Greece led by ultra-nationalists which, although a NATO member like Turkey, took a far more aggressive stance toward Cyprus that alarmed Ankara enough to occupy the northern part of Cyprus in 1974.  This was intended as a temporary occupation pending a solution to the crises.  In 1983 the now military rulers in Ankara created the Republic of Northern Cyprus.  The crisis is still pending almost 40 years’ later and temporary has hardened to permanent.

Turkish leadership through this period was anchored on the military which, regardless of the country, is genetically wired not to give up ground.  Ankara’s generals clearly viewed the Greeks with suspicion (a mutual perception), were entirely disinclined to cooperate with anyone over Cyprus (including the UN which wanted re-unification) and anyway, liked their new base in the Eastern Med.  

Turkish attitudes and interests changed dramatically with the election of the AKP in 2003 and the move toward integration with the EU which considered the division of Cyprus with some distaste.  As far as the AKP was concerned, they went above and beyond to please the EU.  Unfortunately, the EU  was, to say the least, unresponsive and Turkish attitudes have been formed by that lack of EU approval to Ankara’s efforts - in full – to support to the U.N. unification plan proposed by the then secretary general Kofi Annan.  Unsurprisingly, nationalists in both Ankara and Nicosia were infuriated with the idea that there might be some solution.  There was no reward for the efforts by the AKP and Turkey to accept the UN plan and when a referendum was held in Cyprus, which would have resulted in re-unification, the Turkish population voted overwhelmingly to support it while the Greeks rejected the plan.   Shortly thereafter, the EU welcomed the Greeks who voted “no” into the EU club proving to Ankara that, as far as they and Europe were concerned,  no good deed goes unpunished. 

Ankara’s growing, but still reversible assessment by 2005 was that if it followed the rules of the club it was trying to join, its reward would be rejection. Even by 2003 It was feeling far more confident politically and economically – a trend which began before the AKP took power and originated around the time of the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkey viewed that particular event as an opportunity for itself – not NATO or the EU.  It rapidly increased its presence in the former Soviet colonies in Turkic Central Asia and Azerbaijan.  It ramped up trade and investment with both the Russian Federation and Ukraine and extended its diplomatic clout regionally.  Turkey was looking out for its interests first.  The Cyprus problem, largely a result in its view of broken promises by the EU, began the ascent to regional power.

This brings us to the recent past and the next post on the view from Ankara.

Putin's Enlightenment Award Vaporizes

Image via Wikipedia

The prize I referred to below that was bestowed on Vladimir Putin was withdrawn.  The Quadriga Prize, bestowed on the anniversary of German reunification on October 3, is a private award that recognizes "role models for enlightenment, dedication and the public good."

Awarding it to Putin was a travesty - now corrected.  Medvedev's mild rebuke for the revocation is telling.

Thoughts for the Day

Image by Getty Images via @daylife

Before moving on to discussing the new, old world order two thoughts for the day:

1.  Is anyone - except right wing troglodytes - upset about what is happening to the troglodyte in chief Rupert and his mini-trog son?  Bring it on and bring him down.
2.  Germany's attitude toward Greece and the future of the Eurozone, not to mention the EU, is a direct example of my new, old world order.  But then, what do you expect from a country which just awarded Vladimir Putin a coveted prize by ignoring his destruction of the fledgeling Russian democracy?

New, Old World Order

I am, finally, returning to a thesis not widely supported but which I believe is rapidly taking shape: the world has returned to a pre-1939 political structure where regional powers are making more foreign policy decisions based on national interests rather than within alliances. Blocs like NATO, ASEAN and even Shanghai Cooperation Organization are have become largely clubs without transnational impact, except at times militarily like NATO, and even then are severely constrained by the conflicting international interests of their members.  This is also true of the European Union where the political (and perhaps fiscal) unraveling of the Eurozone is proceeding apace.

Some caveats.  First, this is not about the perceived decline of the United States because it is not a decline except in relative terms.  It is about the reality of multi-polarity and local dominance and not absolute decline and fall – something a vast number of Europeans and Americans simply are too reluctant or obtuse to understand. The United States is still the leading military power on a planet-wide basis in general.  Its navy with accompanying air power can go anywhere, anytime and push anyone out of the way. No one can project military power like the US and no one is going to be able to do so for a very long time. In the wrong hands, as we have seen, that has been a problem.  But, there is simply no competition.

Nevertheless, on land and in foreign affairs, it is a different matter. The ill-conceived war in Iraq and the seemingly endless war in Afghanistan have drained the power of the United States militarily, economically and politically.  The policies of the neo-cons and the far right in the US have destroyed the “city on the hill” image that Ronald Reagan tried to push both domestically and internationally. The eight year Bush administration buried the credibility, economy and good will felt toward the US with its astonishingly arrogant, incompetent (but unsurprising) foreign policy otherwise known as the ‘go-it-alone’, ‘with us or against us’ and ‘international agreements be damned’ posturing. 

Second, the European Union remains a creation with enormous potential; but the failure to push for more political integration is now fraying the edges of its economic foundation.  If it is able to resolve the fiscal issues of its member states fairly, then the opportunity to conduct a unified foreign policy will have a chance.  It is not, in my opinion, likely.  Which is why the EU is not included in my list as an entity – just a few member states.

Third, a seismic event could reverse the trend toward the nation-centric foreign policy of pre-1939. I believe in the improbable and dismiss facile bell curves, models and forecasts based on hindsight. It’s what you have dismissed as improbable that will hurt you – usually badly.  The fiscal crises which began in 2008 could have been such an event and should not have been unforeseen, but that moment has dissipated with the uneven recovery – some countries doing much better than others such as in the case of Germany which unfortunately, also proceeded to vocally relegate some member states –the southern tier and Greece in particular - to second citizen status with some distasteful,  nationalistic  remarks bordering on bigotry.   

So, on a region by region basis I believe we are looking at an old, new world order.  It may last a decade or fifty years.  My bet is that it will last longer than anyone expects.  Its structure is that of the realpolitik world of pre-1939 which largely came crashing to a bloody end in 1945 with the rise of the blocs. Some blocs are still around but in reality began a rapid disintegration with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Viewing the political map from this geo-political perspective, there are several clear, locally powerful players – China and India; Russia; Turkey; Germany and France; the Visegrad group; and, of course, the US.  Oh – and BRIC is not a bloc – it is a label of convenience mostly for economists who, like Linus and his blanket, need to pigeon-hole un-related countries into nice chewable morsels. 

I have not included Iran because, compared to the others and despite the hysterics of the galactically stupid right wing in the US, it simply doesn’t count.  Its economy is in shambles and it is politically unstable and cannot risk going to war or cutting off the Strait of Hormuz because that would invite retaliation of the most unpleasant sort by almost everyone.  It’s not near to building a single nuclear bomb and couldn’t afford to toss it in any direction even it did manage that amazingly difficult task because then it would be wiped out.

I did not include any African country because, well, if you can name one that is a regional power with enough influence both economically and militarily to do anything with significant impact except very locally, you win a cookie.  South Africa is the sub-Sahara elephant in the room– but its absurd attempts to play on the world stage as it has in Libya make it more of an annoying busybody than effective player.  The African Union in general is an old boys’ club intent on maintaining the status quo. Just look at the lack of effective condemnation of Mugabe’s reign by the AU. 

I also do not include any South American country despite my strong temptation to present Brazil as a player.  Maybe soon, but not now.

That’s my pre-amble.  Next time, and as a first choice, let’s look at Turkey or, more to the point, how Turkey looks at everyone else and their reaction.