Iran on the Brink

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Well. Not exactly. But the Western media would have you believe it is as they continue to portray the "opposition" as some sort of anti-clerical, anti-Islamic group (this does not apply to the protesters in the street who are likely very anti-clerical rule).

I recently received an email of an alternative view which seems to me much more reality based although I can't vouch for its accuracy. Essentially, the alternative view says this:

1. This is not about a conflict of ideology. It is about economics - those that affect the economic elites.

2. On one side is Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The other side is represented by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The former has been on the short end of the deal to Ahmadinejad lately and his businesses are not doing well. Remember, he is a very wealthy cleric.

3. Rafsanjani is basically shut down in Iran - he is no longer privy to the inner circle discussions or decisions.

4. The 30 year old sanctions have taken a toll and Rafsanjani developed a strong overseas network for trade. So, Rafsanjani's overseas network has come into play.

5. Ahmadinejad did not sit on his hands and has been developing his own overseas network. This has not worked out so well as Rafsanjani gave the names etc of people the President had been working with to the CIA and MI5 who have dutifully scotched the deals. In a tit for tat, Ahamdinejad closed his opponents out of the internal banking system. Bad if you need loans to run businesses.

6. If either side voiced this in public, the religious mantle they cover themselves with would vanish. Nothing but the political and economic hacks that they are.

7. The street protests are mostly those Iranians who are westernized. Not many, I'm afraid.

8. The growing pressure by security forces to put an end to the demonstrations is becoming intense. If they are unleashed, the bloodshed so far seen will be nothing.

9. Since Rafsanjani is out of the loop, anything he or his people say to the west must be considered unreliable.

10. Ahmadinejad will deal on the nuclear issue but the US has to simultaneously (or a nano-second before) drop sanctions so that he will come out looking like a savior.

11. The economic control war is playing out, but the regime is running thin on patience.

What is left unsaid above is what would happen if the US agreed, as a New Year gesture, to lift sanctions? Would the demonstrations stop - or be stopped?

As I said, take the above with a grain of salt. But it is entirely plausible under the circumstances and is consistent with other political power struggles - one only needs to look to the clan struggle going on now in Russia. It's all about the money.

The Friday Prayer

Ayatollah Khamenei has proven uncompromising. This is likely because the maneuvering taking place under the radar of attempted media coverage, particularly by Rafsanjani, is a threat to him more than Ahmadinejad.

The speech does not offer any hope to those who are challenging the election. The threat that the demonstrators "face the consequences" should be taken seriously, but Khamenei needs the acquiescence of Mousavi and the other candidates to call off the demonstrators since they are part of the establishment. An attack on the demonstrators without a statement from Mousavi that they should all go home would have consequences for the regime that could open the way for full destabilization. This weekend will be critical.

A couple of things are certain, however. Iran clearly has had the pretense of its brand of democracy stripped away. There is no freedom of speech. Newspapers cannot publish opposition materials, electronic media of all forms is jammed and the leadership is more than a little paranoid. All this must be kept in mind for future negotiations with the government about any issue.

What is strange among all countries of this type (Khazakstan, Azerbaijan, Russia, China and Venezuela) is that open elections would very likely return to power those who are currently in power. Medvedev and Putin are so popular that a real open campaign would be decided in a landslide in their favor. The same is true for Khazakstan, and probably true, though less so, for Azerbaijan. They need the pretence because they want to hold on to power more than anything else.

I remain more or less convinced that nothing will change in Iran, or if it does, outsiders will only see the shadows, like the shadow puppets of Indonesia, and nothing will be clear. Dealing with Iran in the future will be more difficult once the current situation settles down. But that is no reason not to continue with opening the door to negotiations. There is no other choice.

What Next for Iran?

Image by Getty Images via Daylife

As the Guardian Council begins its review of 646 electoral complaints, Mousavi supporters are gathering while arrests are accelerating, including former government officials and journalists. The current government is losing its credibility in a hurry. Even Medvedev avoided a scheduled meeting with Ahmadinejad, reducing it to a handshake.

President Ahmadinejad is not short of enemies. Powerful enemies. One of those enemies is also a one of the defeated candidates for president, Mohsen Rezaie, who happens to be a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander. With no chance of winning anyway, his opposition strips away an important element of strength of Ahmadinejad.

Rezaie is also secretary of the Expediency Council. The Council handles disputes and liaison between the office of president and parliament (Majlis). It also oversees all three branches of government and directs strategic policy planning for Iran. At the head of the Council sits Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the most powerful clerics in the Islamic Republic for over 20 years. He, unlike, Khamenei, has not uttered a single word since the election and is not a big fan of Ahmadinejad. The pressure on Khamenei is huge to take a stand against Ahmadinejad - perhaps even to the extent of his own removal.

The last question is whether the government will roll out the tanks. It is already clear that these demonstrations have shaken the Islamic Republic and if not a game changer, have redrawn its social and political structure. If Ahmadinejad and his supporters decide on a Tiananmin moment, Iran's putative attempt at a leadership role in the region will be flushed, hardliners in Israel will be strengthened and its economy will begin to circle the drain.