New, Old World Order

I am, finally, returning to a thesis not widely supported but which I believe is rapidly taking shape: the world has returned to a pre-1939 political structure where regional powers are making more foreign policy decisions based on national interests rather than within alliances. Blocs like NATO, ASEAN and even Shanghai Cooperation Organization are have become largely clubs without transnational impact, except at times militarily like NATO, and even then are severely constrained by the conflicting international interests of their members.  This is also true of the European Union where the political (and perhaps fiscal) unraveling of the Eurozone is proceeding apace.

Some caveats.  First, this is not about the perceived decline of the United States because it is not a decline except in relative terms.  It is about the reality of multi-polarity and local dominance and not absolute decline and fall – something a vast number of Europeans and Americans simply are too reluctant or obtuse to understand. The United States is still the leading military power on a planet-wide basis in general.  Its navy with accompanying air power can go anywhere, anytime and push anyone out of the way. No one can project military power like the US and no one is going to be able to do so for a very long time. In the wrong hands, as we have seen, that has been a problem.  But, there is simply no competition.

Nevertheless, on land and in foreign affairs, it is a different matter. The ill-conceived war in Iraq and the seemingly endless war in Afghanistan have drained the power of the United States militarily, economically and politically.  The policies of the neo-cons and the far right in the US have destroyed the “city on the hill” image that Ronald Reagan tried to push both domestically and internationally. The eight year Bush administration buried the credibility, economy and good will felt toward the US with its astonishingly arrogant, incompetent (but unsurprising) foreign policy otherwise known as the ‘go-it-alone’, ‘with us or against us’ and ‘international agreements be damned’ posturing. 

Second, the European Union remains a creation with enormous potential; but the failure to push for more political integration is now fraying the edges of its economic foundation.  If it is able to resolve the fiscal issues of its member states fairly, then the opportunity to conduct a unified foreign policy will have a chance.  It is not, in my opinion, likely.  Which is why the EU is not included in my list as an entity – just a few member states.

Third, a seismic event could reverse the trend toward the nation-centric foreign policy of pre-1939. I believe in the improbable and dismiss facile bell curves, models and forecasts based on hindsight. It’s what you have dismissed as improbable that will hurt you – usually badly.  The fiscal crises which began in 2008 could have been such an event and should not have been unforeseen, but that moment has dissipated with the uneven recovery – some countries doing much better than others such as in the case of Germany which unfortunately, also proceeded to vocally relegate some member states –the southern tier and Greece in particular - to second citizen status with some distasteful,  nationalistic  remarks bordering on bigotry.   

So, on a region by region basis I believe we are looking at an old, new world order.  It may last a decade or fifty years.  My bet is that it will last longer than anyone expects.  Its structure is that of the realpolitik world of pre-1939 which largely came crashing to a bloody end in 1945 with the rise of the blocs. Some blocs are still around but in reality began a rapid disintegration with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Viewing the political map from this geo-political perspective, there are several clear, locally powerful players – China and India; Russia; Turkey; Germany and France; the Visegrad group; and, of course, the US.  Oh – and BRIC is not a bloc – it is a label of convenience mostly for economists who, like Linus and his blanket, need to pigeon-hole un-related countries into nice chewable morsels. 

I have not included Iran because, compared to the others and despite the hysterics of the galactically stupid right wing in the US, it simply doesn’t count.  Its economy is in shambles and it is politically unstable and cannot risk going to war or cutting off the Strait of Hormuz because that would invite retaliation of the most unpleasant sort by almost everyone.  It’s not near to building a single nuclear bomb and couldn’t afford to toss it in any direction even it did manage that amazingly difficult task because then it would be wiped out.

I did not include any African country because, well, if you can name one that is a regional power with enough influence both economically and militarily to do anything with significant impact except very locally, you win a cookie.  South Africa is the sub-Sahara elephant in the room– but its absurd attempts to play on the world stage as it has in Libya make it more of an annoying busybody than effective player.  The African Union in general is an old boys’ club intent on maintaining the status quo. Just look at the lack of effective condemnation of Mugabe’s reign by the AU. 

I also do not include any South American country despite my strong temptation to present Brazil as a player.  Maybe soon, but not now.

That’s my pre-amble.  Next time, and as a first choice, let’s look at Turkey or, more to the point, how Turkey looks at everyone else and their reaction.

The Rise of History

Francis Fukuyama pronounced the death of history toward the end of the 20th century, but since then history is rising. The collapse of the Soviet Union and apparent emergence of the West in triumph sounds strangely hollow after the end of the first decade of the 21st century. The structure that framed the world from 1945 to 1991 was supported by two, huge foundation stones – the US and the USSR. When one of the foundation blocks vanished, rather than an end to history, the resulting cloud of dust obscured the beginnings of the structural changes which are now settling into a new pattern. History strikes back.


This resurrection of a pattern of national interactions, resulting in temporary groups of blocks which nations like the US find difficult to grasp, is beginning to reveal a return to natural historical patterns based on pre-cold war views.

It is very clear that the intellectually challenged in the US have difficulty with their rapidly sinking influence which had dominated the planet since 1945. There are those who have the ability and intellect to deal with the changing environment. But the rise of the genuinely ignorant – the Tancredos, Palins, Becks, Limbaughs and the rest of their ilk – bodes poorly for US foreign policy in the future. Yes, there are the Chuck Hagels of the US – but they have been pushed aside by a great mass of simply stupid, uneducated and hateful people.

Although it is certainly not alone in comprehending the new, current reality of history’s rebirth, the US has difficulty dealing with it. An example of the discomfort for the US is the visit by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu of Turkey to China and their deepening relationship. The fact of the matter is that nations are returning to normality by following their national interests and not the direction mapped for them by organizations such as NATO, the long-defunct Warsaw Pact, ASEAN or by former power centers in Moscow or Washington.

Turkey is establishing strong ties with China because it is in its interests now to do so. However, in the world of the neo-cons and Palinites in the US for example, one must pick sides. Black and white. Yes or no. For these people the independent foreign policy of Turkey is a sign of betrayal. Why can’t Ankara just do what they are told like the old days? Because, that’s why it’s called history. It’s gone. Lessons to be learned and mistakes not to be repeated (hopefully). Turkey has excellent relationships with the west. US President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were meeting six or seven times a year while the US and Turkish leaders met at most two times a year a decade ago. There is a constant stream of contact with Western Europe. The fact that Turkey also deals with its neighbours, Iran and Syria, and is reaching out to establish more ties with China is, well, normal.

The same can be said for Brazil. Despite the infantile Hugo Chavez who, like North Korean leaders, stamps his feet and repeats a tired litany of cold war, Castro-like platitudes while his country founders economically, it is Brazil that is leading the way in the south. Brazil and Turkey have a growing trade and political relationship outside of anyone’s sphere of influence. Brazill is following a foreign policy that supports its - not North American - interests.  Clearly disturbing to some up north who likely believe that Brazil's national language is Spanish.

Russia, formerly flying high under Putin, is discovering that its military adventurism is not paying many dividends and has, in the case of Georgia, begun to back-fire. Invading a weak neighbour, whatever the provocation, while at the same time promoting ethnic separatism, did not go down well with the international community, particularly its neighbours in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Like the US, it has found that projection of military strength does not equate to political influence except, perhaps, in the short run. Aggressive use of its energy supplies to influence or force compliance with its foreign policy political agenda has not been well received; despite, for example, German dependence on Russian gas and oil, France and Eastern Europe are looking for ways to blunt overreaching. Poland and the Baltic States look to the US for support through a military footprint, while France is building more nuclear power plants. Medvedev seems to be getting the point and has been far more interested in spreading influence through trade deals rather than threats.  The Putin era is over in Russia.

China, although attempting to represent the new paradigm in foreign policy normality, has some problems of its own. Its recent move to use the cut-off of rare metals as punishment for perceived foreign policy slights by Japan raises concerns among its trading partners. The fears surfacing over its commercial policies are linked to fears over strategic intentions. Unfair trade practices don’t work in the long-term.  Unfortunately, it is unclear who are the rising stars in China and the fingerprints of an aggressively minded military are appearing on many policy papers.

How will the US adapt to the new reality? In the short run, not well I suspect because of a domestic economic climate that has not only exposed the failure of free-wheeling capitalism promoted by previous Republican administrations, but  perhaps more importantly uncovered the hidden racism, religious intolerance and has led to the rise of a brown-shirt movement which constitutes a threat to the republic. But, sooner or later, the US will need to realize that its disproportionate amount of military power does not translate into influence. It cannot continue to equate efforts by others to harmonize relationships with re-alignment. Rather than railing against the normalization of international relationships, the US needs to find a way to capitalize on it – or it will simply lose its perceived “exceptionalism” and influence.