Rocks and Hard Places - Turkish Edition

I’ve just returned from Turkey and unless you’ve been living on Pluto, the four days of shelling by Syrian forces of Turkish towns, killing civilians, and counter-fire by the Turkish army is big news.  Turkey has warned that it is very close to war and the al-Assad regime must cease its attacks – or else.   The “or else” should be of concern to everyone because it is very clear that the Syrian regime is engaging in desperate measures to stay alive and attempting to provoke a war with Turkey in the hopes of destabilizing Turkey with the help of the PKK in the southeastern part of the country.

Turkey should not take the bait.

The Syrian army, consisting of little more than small units in the region and having lost control of large swathes of territory and border crossings, is in no condition to resist a Turkish assault.  It could be swept from the border area and would likely end up in a burning heap along the roads leading to Damascus.  That is not in the interests of Turkey for several reasons.

The first is that the Turkish economy is growing at 7% and has been doing so for a good part of the last decade.  A war puts the economy at serious risk of losing momentum, if not stopping growth altogether.  The towns along the Syrian border and the southeast in general had been booming until the Assad regime’s struggle for survival brought trade crashing to the ground.

Second, the PKK is under extraordinary pressure both militarily and politically. Turkey maintains military bases inside Iraq (much to Baghdad’s ineffective vocal objections) to counter PKK activities while at the same time Ankara has pursued a policy of inclusion for the Kurds within its borders.  A war puts political stability inside Turkey at risk, would energize the PKK and cause turmoil in large parts of eastern Turkey.

Third, Ankara is clearly aware of the geo-political problems in the region.  The Assad regime is allied with Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon.  Iran has invested considerable money and reputation into the fight – money it can ill afford to lose, not to mention losing the political advantages it has gained since the Iraq war.  Without Russian support, the Assad regime could not continue its policy of slaughter. Russia is a major trading partner of Turkey and furthermore, controls the politics of Armenia which impacts Turkey’s resource rich ally, Azerbaijan.

Fourth, Turkey cannot count on NATO for support.  Although it has the right under international law to defend itself, invoking Article 5 to bring in all of NATO is likely to go nowhere.  The US and Europe, with the probable exception of France, have no stomach for war in the region.  Syria is not Libya and military intervention by NATO – which is the default military organization – would trigger large asymmetrical responses by Iran and its surrogate Hezbollah that would affect Israel and the Gulf.  Turkey would be on its own.

A full scale border crossing, no doubt inflicting what would be crushing losses on the Syrian military, would have economic, social and political repercussions that cannot be predicted, but all of which can be described charitably as not good for Turkey.

The Turkish Parliament has voted in favour of a motion permitting the government to engage in cross-border raids on Syria and in the past few days, the Turkish military has moved additional tanks and mechanized units to the region hoping to send a message.  Prime Minister Erdoğan said yesterday “I am calling once more on the al-Assad regime and its supporters: Don’t dare to test Turkey’s patience,” adding that testing Turkey’s capacity for deterrence would be “a fatal mistake.”  The motion authorizing raids is not a blank check, however; more importantly, It was on the agenda in any event to renew the authorization for the Iraq bases targeting the PKK.  The timing is coincidental. Hopefully, Damascus will get the message.

Russian and Iranian support will not save al-Assad or his regime as rebels continue to seize territory and have failed to be dislodged from Homs, Aleppo or villages along the border with Turkey.  I don’t doubt that Turkey will launch cross-border missions to clear out Syrian military positions  if necessary – but they can be pushed back out of range without doing so and provide leverage so that  the rebel units in the area could take control. 

At the end of the day Turkey needs to show restraint – difficult under the type of provocation pursued by Damascus.  They are trapped between national interest and national honour.  But, Turkey has more to lose than gain if it unleashes its army.   

The Syrian civil war, now a sectarian one as well, will be a swamp which, once sucked into, will be difficult to escape.  Unfortunately, NATO and the West are tired of nation building and the UN is paralyzed by Russian pretensions of being a major power and Chinese fundamental principle of non-interference. Turkey is left with little choice but to deal with the situation that involves a civil war along hundreds of miles of its border and more than 100,000 refugees.  The rest of world will let Turkey sort this out and it does not have a lot of choices for maneuver.  One choice however – massive military intervention – should be avoided.

Be Careful What You Wish For...

Iran, hosting the non-aligned conference this week in Tehran, launched a strenuous effort to get Mohamed Mursi, the new Egyptian president, to attend.  They were successful and really, really happy. 

Mursi, on the other hand, revealed a level of independence that no one – NO ONE – anticipated as he condemned the Syrian government and urged the Syrian rebels to unify and turn out President Assad.  No doubt somewhat shocked, the Syrian delegation walked out.  More importantly, the Iranian government likely had a collective heart attack as Mursi, a conservative from the Muslim Brotherhood (feared and loathed by the Americans and Israelis) basically told Iran that he supported the rebels whom the West want to see take down Assad, putting him on the same side as Turkey, Western Europe and the US and against Russia, Iran and the current Syrian government. I leave China out because their veto of the UN resolutions, where they joined Russia, were  based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country (not liking the idea that it could be applied to them) rather than the vaporization of an ally and major arms purchaser.  

As if to rub salt into the wound, Mursi then went on to compare the rebel cause in Syria to the plight of the Palestinians.  Just to be clear – the Palestinian cause is sacred to Egypt and a frequent, convenient rallying point for Iranian propaganda.  Mursi has effectively put Iran in the shoes of Israel vis a vis the Syrian rebels. Sting much? 

This speech is clearly not what Iran wanted and ups their cost as they will now have to deal with an increasingly annoyed Turkish government, the vast wealth of Qatar and Saudi Arabia and now a moral opponent in the leading Arab state of Egypt supposedly being run by one of their own. This is clearly not the optimum outcome from the point of view of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor will Hezbollah be celebrating in the streets of Beirut.  Hezbollah leadership is likely re-calibrating everything at this point.

Multiple  factors seem to be in play. Aside from the fact that President Mursi is a creation of the Egyptian revolution and likely feels a good deal of sympathy for the similar revolt in Syria which began peacefully and was met by violent responses from the Assad family,  Mursi is Sunni in a largely Sunni country.  Turkey is Sunni as well.  The Sunni minority in Iraq has been sidelined from power, with the Sunni Vice President forced to flee to Istanbul.  Iran has the upper hand in Iraq (thanks Bush Jr.) and Egypt wants Western, Qatari and Saudi money and investment.  Qatar and Saudi Arabia are, like Egypt and Syria, Arab.  Iran is decidedly not Arab or Sunni and, to make matters worse is flexing its muscle in the direction of the Gulf Arab states.

So, now the game becomes more complex.  Moscow is sweating and Iran is probably not in the best of moods.  An interesting sidelight to this is the American displeasure that the non-aligned movement held its conference in Tehran.  They actively tried to convince the UN Secretary General not to attend (any place, except Iran).  The Republican Party railed against the meeting and the UN – largely because they prefer killing to peace - and thought a dictator like Hosni Mubarak was their kinda guy.  Who’s laughing now?

Assad said the army was “cleansing” society and needed some time to finish the job.  Not the best choice of words.  Once ground-to-air missiles and some anti-armour weapons begin to make their impact through the largess of Qatar and the Saudi’s, Moscow should start to fixture a nice dacha for him.

Shifting Sands for the Kurds

Flag of Kurdistan (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Once upon a time the Kurds were frequently shown a red-line by Turkey that they could never cross – independence. Even as late as 2010, the warning was in effect.  To fight the PKK, the Turkish army covers Kurdish regions in the east of Turkey and has intermittently thought nothing of crossing into Iraq, in force, to attack PKK home bases.  But the Kurdish government in Erbil is different. It is rich, peaceful and it is engaged in a cold-war with Baghdad. 

Kurdish Iraq has been part of the country in name only for at least a decade.  Having first been protected by the no-fly zone in effect against Saddam Hussein, it became de-facto independent after his army was pulverized in the first Iraq war and then systematically dismantled by the invasion in 2003.  Both wars were beneficial for the Kurds. (Please note – I am not defending the illegal, ill-conceived 2003 invasion and its badly handled aftermath). Erbil is now probably the richest city in Iraq as a result of oil, maintains a decent military, enjoys relative peace and can thumb its nose at the government in Baghdad.   It is also stable – something Ankara appreciates on its borders.

The former peace-in-the-neighborhood policy is changing to stark realism as Ankara understands that as a major regional power – perhaps the regional power – choices need to be made. Gradually, Kurds in Turkey are gaining their civil rights – a long road lies ahead in that respect – but Turkey knows that being friends with every neighbor is not a policy choice.  As a result, given the tension that exists between Shia controlled Iraq and Sunni Turkey, the Kurds may find that a deal with Ankara and future independence is not just a dream.

Iraq, Syria and Iran are upset with Turkey and Turkey has severed relations with the Assad regime while offering aid to Syrian refugees and has issued blunt warnings of military action to Damascus – not something Iran appreciates or wants to see.  The Kurds, however, have been welcomed. Not so long ago Masoud Barzani, the Kurdish Regional Government PM, paid a visit to Ankara where he was treated as a head-of-state.  Barzani’s government is increasingly tied to Turkey by both trade and the need for security against what the Kurds believe is a hostile government in Baghdad and a not so friendly Iran. This has resulted into a Kurdish policy of not irritating Ankara by showing any sort of support for the outlawed PKK.

In the past few days, the al-Maliki government in Baghdad has even more reason to be annoyed with Turkey. Ankara has said that the fugitive Vice President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashemi (a Sunni) wanted for allegedly orchestrating death squads and attacking Shiites, is their guest and that the recently issued “red notice” by Interpol is not an arrest warrant and can be safely (if embarrassingly) ignored.  They are not going to do anything except treat him as a guest.  All these past and current events present the Kurds in Erbil with an opportunity for further de-facto independence, if not de-jure.

Some years ago, the suggestion was floated that Iraq should simply be divided in three, Shia south, Sunni west and Kurdish north.  The idea was derided as dangerous.  But it is playing out. If Erbil and Ankara reach a degree a comfort with each other, it would be beneficial to both. 

Iran loses Turkey - and everything else

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey at Çanakkale Türkçe: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

After a prolonged absence from posting, I'm back.  I have frankly been immersed in legislative initiatives in Tajikistan and meetings in Kyiv and Istanbul for a major program in the Black Sea basin. 

Nevertheless, the dry spell should be over for the time being. 

The first item on the agenda is a quick post on the fluid dynamics in the Middle East brought on by the Syrian civil war and attrocities which have been committed by the al Assad regime.

The systematic murder of women, children and other civilians in order to crush the revolt represented largely by the Free Syrian Army, has been unresolved.  Kofi Annan says he is shocked by the massive bloodshed committed by Syrian regular army forces in the period leading up to the agreed upon cease fire and withdrawal of army units from cities and towns in Syria.  Why he is shocked is beyond comprehension.  There is nothing in the Baath regime's history that would have indicated other than brutal repression when their control was threatened.  Russia  claims to support the Annan mission - except that it is deliberately facilitating the murders as is China.

Now, the situation is changing because the civil war has become decidedly a geopolitical struggle between Iran and its not-so-friendly neighbors and the West.  The casualties are the civilians.  Nevertheless, Iran seems to have overplayed its hand and is now openly in a war of words with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia extending to threats of punishment.  They have also slapped away the strongest power in the region, Turkey, by first calling Turkey and enemy of the Syrian people for hosting the Friends of Syria conference on April 1 and then questioning the location of new nuclear talks, advocating a change of venue from Istanbul to Damascus or Baghdad. 

The optics of a successful rising Iran have now changed. Ankara bent over backwards to mediate on the nuclear issue and a week ago Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Ayatollah Khamanei to promote negations and avoid a military strike (however unlikely).  The meeting ended with a statement when Ayatollah Khameni said that  “building weapons of mass destruction amounts to a sin in our religion.”  Case closed. Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu went home.

Then Iran rejected Istanbul as venue and the situation began to unravel alarmingly. Clearly, Iran has learned nothing from following the personality of Erdoğan.  He has a tendency to take things personally. Very personally and very publicly.  Beware an Erdoğan scorned.  Now he accused Iran of evasion and self-isolation. Then he turned to the Syria problem and Iran's ally.

Iran has managed to piss-off the most powerful, and formerly neutral country in the Middle East. It has crossed the line and lost Turkey (an overwhelmingly Sunni nation with elections approaching). Tehran’s mendacity is evident not only its anti-Turkish ranting on Syria, where it itself is assisting in the slaughter, but also its astonishing disrespect to Turkey's efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis.

Now, Erdoğan  says the country will wait "patiently" to see if Syria abides by a cease-fire deadline on Tuesday, but may take certain "steps" if the violence does not stop after that. Nearly 700 Syrian escaped to Turkey last Friday.  During a 36 hour period last eek about 2,800 crossed the to escape a helicopter-backed assault by Syrian troops.  No one can expect Turkey to continue to accept more refugees.  It already host 24,000.

What "certain steps" means is unknown - but the Turkish army can control the border from the Syrian side without too much worry about Syrian army units. Assad is on his way out.  Iran is going to lose this gambit and at the same time has lost the help of important players in the region, furthering its isolation.  Rarely has any country misplayed its hand in such a way.

France and Freedom of Speach

I’ve been gone for almost a month since my day job is in an end-year crunch to complete a raft of legislation here in Tajikistan.   As the holiday period approaches though, the rush by the government has abated.

The French lower house of parliament recently voted to make it a crime to deny that the Armenians suffered genocide during 1915 at the hands of the Ottomans.  The French should – but won’t – discuss the 1.7 million Algerians that were killed during their colonial war.  That’s ok as we all know that governments are hypocritical when it comes to their own history but are easily lured by the political advantage of condemning other nations or peoples. 

However, France and some other continental countries go further that simply expressing an opinion. They legislate against any other opinion that challenges their view.  Note to France (and Germany) – this is curbing the freedom of speech which you hold is one of the foundations of liberal democracy.  It is unique to France and such actions would never occur in the US or the UK.

There is no question that Turkey needs to move forward on its own to recognize the tragedy of 1915 – perpetrated by a different government in both form and substance.   It was clearly an attempt at ethnic cleansing – not genocide (as the word did not exist until recently).  The actions of the Ottomans need to be addressed between Armenia and Turkey and I humbly suggest that the comfortable Armenians in the United States and France keep their collective noses out of the issue.  I spent enough time in Armenia to know that many there would be able to resolve their differences in the region if they were permitted by the diaspora to do so.

And perhaps France and Germany should keep in mind that their great EU experiment is heading for catastrophe while Turkey is a rising power that should be courted, not rejected not least because its economy puts every EU member, except for Poland, to shame.

Turkey Downgrades Israel

As a result of the findings in the UN report on the Gaza flotilla, Turkey has lowered the diplomatic level to the lowest it could without completely breaking relations.  The isolation of Israel is accelerating and will reach a high point when the vote for recognition of a Palestinian state is taken this month in the UN.

The complete inability of the Israeli government to reach a compromise for an apology has lost it a key ally for the forseable future. You can't get any dumber than this (well, you can - just take a look at the state of US politics courtesy of the Republicans and its Tea Party facist supporters).

Last Word on Turkey

Image via Wikipedia

In the not so distant past, Turkey was impoverished, inward-looking nation, mistrustful – if not actively hostile – to its neighbors who were seen as either enemies of the state at worst or backstabbing traitors at best.  Not.Any.Longer.

Turkey’s foreign policy has changed as rapidly as its internal politics – transforming from a closed, totalitarian system to a reasonably open and relatively liberal political environment while viewing its neighbors and Europe as opportunities and allies.  It is closer to European norms of democracy than the Kemalist military and bureaucratic omnipresence.

Turkey does not view the EU as indispensable and the status quo in the relationship will not spell the end of civilization as far as Ankara is concerned.  Turkey intends to continue policies of economic and diplomatic outreach with its neighbors as part of its expanding influence and commercial interests. Although not particularly concerned about the stalled EU accession process because the EU is still the largest trading partner, the atmospherics could be poisoned by the continuing deadlock resulting in an antagonistic attitude.

With the recent elections resulting in extending the 9 year rule of the AKP, concerns have been amplified regarding the direction of Turkey to the extent that France has even become more opposed to any accession talk.  These are misplaced concerns although the Putinization of the political structure remains a fear as the AKP and the PM in particular react adversely to any sort of criticism.  However, of the several scenarios for Turkish development, I think that the fear of a shift toward authoritarian rule – Islamist, or militant secularist/ Kemalist – is unlikely. I believe that Turkey will continue its path toward pluralism and liberal democracy.

We have seen that modern Turkey was founded through a top-down approach.  It was secular and authoritarian.  Between 1945 and the early 1980s a form of managed democracy took the place of the authoritarian regimes.  But, this managed democracy was run by the military.  It may have been multi-party but it was tightly controlled by the army and hand selected bureaucrats with an occasional coup thrown in. Then the evil empire vanished and with it the Cold War.  The most recent transition had begun to form a liberal, pluralistic society from the bottom-up which is still evolving, sometimes painfully.  The business class that grew from this transition came from the center of Turkey - conservative and Muslim; but, it believed in liberal economics and true democratic rule, not the elitism of the Istanbul business interests.

The economic change and the demographics of its source led to the founding of the AKP led by Erdoğan and his friends in 2001. The new party supported EU accession, and a European market styled democracy. It has been in power for a decade, many a huge number of mistakes and certainly has its flaws.  Critics have been unwelcome – and critics abound. But, it’s hard to argue with success - economic stability, an average of 6-7 percent annual growth rate, and a tripling of per capita income from little above $3,000 in 2002 to about $10,000 in 2010. Broad freedoms, economic success and a vibrant democracy are popular.  Try and change it and the AKP will fall.

In foreign policy, Turkey has reversed its previous attitudes toward its neighbors. Rather than viewing them with mistrust, they have been drawn closer.  Unlike the short sighted Europeans, no visas are required for travel between Georgia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Russia and Syria.  The cost of visas for others is minimal and visas are, unlike those for a closed EU, easy to obtain.  This is called soft-power.

Much of the reforms and democratic trends over the past decade have been helped by the EU’s support.  Then political and economic changes in Europe modified the dynamics.  Despite the confirmation of Turkish EU eligibility by Brussels five times, the latest coming in 2002, the French simply decided to ignore EU rules and promises and actively opposed Turkey. No one in Europe pointed out to France that its opposition was improper.  The ossified EU system is making a mistake of huge proportions.

Turkey is discovering new methods of using its soft power, both cultural and economic, to expand its influence despite the snubs of the EU. They no longer perceive Russia or even Greece and Armenia as enemies. Its view of its neighbors reinforces Turkish self-confidence as a growing regional hegemon that does not need the approval of Europe or the US.  Turkish foreign policy continues to develop dynamically and proactively.  It looks ahead, not to the past but still remembers its history and civilization. Its neighbors should take notice because Turks do and it governs how they perceive the region and their role in it.  Geo-politically it occupies a unique position and has the economic, cultural and military depth to make itself a force.

This is why the EU’s antagonistic attitude is so astoundingly stupid.  Turkish foreign policy mantra of peace in the neighborhood is exactly that of the EU stated policy. It is already an extension of the policy established by Brussels and supports that policy.  Rather than show any sort of appreciation, Europe seems to think that this is some sort of competition. Another mistake and typical of European arrogance.  What is it that Europe doesn’t get?  Turkey is not Serbia or, frankly, Slovakia or Romania – just other applicant states. It is a strategic player and key to stability in the Middle East.

Europe, and to some extent the US, appear to think that Turkish involvement economically and socially with  Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, not to mention its strong desire to prevent a conflagration in the Middle East, are somehow signals of a change in direction away from the West.  This is not a zero sum game and this line of reasoning in Europe and the US borders on the absurd, playing only to the uninformed and for the benefit of the talking heads. 

Turkey has made some foreign policy mistakes but appears to be a quick learner. If Ankara is guilty of anything, it is one of tone.  The PM in this regard does not do himself any favours.  Ridiculous tirades against Israel, statements that genocide is prohibited by the Koran and therefore the government of Sudan could not have committed the crime, and walking out of meetings may play well in the Turkish media, but are intemperate and need to be avoided.

Turkey is a well on its way to becoming a regional, indispensible power – one that the EU and the US need to engage more effectively.  Turkey is charting a foreign policy path that protects and extends its interests.  The Cold War and the old blocs are gone.

Crescent Rising - Part 1

Image via Wikipedia

First, a thimbleful of background, as this is not meant to detail the complexities of the rise of the Turkish state but establish their parallax view.
Back in the not so distant past, Turkey towed the line.  As a subservient, reliable partner of the West during the Cold War, Turkey could be counted on to do and say whatever NATO and the US wanted.  Of course, the new nation, founded only in 1922 after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent revolution led by Kamal Ataturk, was less than 25 years old when the Cold War started.   Ataturk, of course, pulled Turkey abruptly into the West and moved its capital from imperial Constantinople to the somewhat desolate Ankara in the center of the Anatolian plateau.  In the process, he stripped away the old imperial trappings and mindset which had brought the Ottomans in on the wrong side of the war, albeit with the significant encouragement of Allied incompetence and, not to put too fine a point on it, British arrogance, adeptly exploited by Berlin.

After the end of the Second World War, during which the new nation of Turkey intelligently remained a neutral, the government – out of historical habit and national interests – moved even closer to the West and became the southern bulwark against the equally new Russian empire now called the Soviet Union.   Turkish foreign policy, dictated by its generals, became whatever NATO and hence US foreign policy, needed it to be.  That was the view from Ankara then.

I suspect one can look to the events of the early 1970s when this easy relationship began to go off the rails in Cyprus as far as Ankara was concerned.  Between 1960 and 1974, Cyprus was a unified republic composed of a Greek majority and Turkish minority, mostly located in the north.  When Greek nationalists began to agitate for annexation by Greece, and complemented their desires with attacks on the Turkish minority (who retaliated at times, but were significantly outnumbered), Ankara became understandably concerned.  Then came the military coup in Greece led by ultra-nationalists which, although a NATO member like Turkey, took a far more aggressive stance toward Cyprus that alarmed Ankara enough to occupy the northern part of Cyprus in 1974.  This was intended as a temporary occupation pending a solution to the crises.  In 1983 the now military rulers in Ankara created the Republic of Northern Cyprus.  The crisis is still pending almost 40 years’ later and temporary has hardened to permanent.

Turkish leadership through this period was anchored on the military which, regardless of the country, is genetically wired not to give up ground.  Ankara’s generals clearly viewed the Greeks with suspicion (a mutual perception), were entirely disinclined to cooperate with anyone over Cyprus (including the UN which wanted re-unification) and anyway, liked their new base in the Eastern Med.  

Turkish attitudes and interests changed dramatically with the election of the AKP in 2003 and the move toward integration with the EU which considered the division of Cyprus with some distaste.  As far as the AKP was concerned, they went above and beyond to please the EU.  Unfortunately, the EU  was, to say the least, unresponsive and Turkish attitudes have been formed by that lack of EU approval to Ankara’s efforts - in full – to support to the U.N. unification plan proposed by the then secretary general Kofi Annan.  Unsurprisingly, nationalists in both Ankara and Nicosia were infuriated with the idea that there might be some solution.  There was no reward for the efforts by the AKP and Turkey to accept the UN plan and when a referendum was held in Cyprus, which would have resulted in re-unification, the Turkish population voted overwhelmingly to support it while the Greeks rejected the plan.   Shortly thereafter, the EU welcomed the Greeks who voted “no” into the EU club proving to Ankara that, as far as they and Europe were concerned,  no good deed goes unpunished. 

Ankara’s growing, but still reversible assessment by 2005 was that if it followed the rules of the club it was trying to join, its reward would be rejection. Even by 2003 It was feeling far more confident politically and economically – a trend which began before the AKP took power and originated around the time of the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkey viewed that particular event as an opportunity for itself – not NATO or the EU.  It rapidly increased its presence in the former Soviet colonies in Turkic Central Asia and Azerbaijan.  It ramped up trade and investment with both the Russian Federation and Ukraine and extended its diplomatic clout regionally.  Turkey was looking out for its interests first.  The Cyprus problem, largely a result in its view of broken promises by the EU, began the ascent to regional power.

This brings us to the recent past and the next post on the view from Ankara.

New, Old World Order

I am, finally, returning to a thesis not widely supported but which I believe is rapidly taking shape: the world has returned to a pre-1939 political structure where regional powers are making more foreign policy decisions based on national interests rather than within alliances. Blocs like NATO, ASEAN and even Shanghai Cooperation Organization are have become largely clubs without transnational impact, except at times militarily like NATO, and even then are severely constrained by the conflicting international interests of their members.  This is also true of the European Union where the political (and perhaps fiscal) unraveling of the Eurozone is proceeding apace.

Some caveats.  First, this is not about the perceived decline of the United States because it is not a decline except in relative terms.  It is about the reality of multi-polarity and local dominance and not absolute decline and fall – something a vast number of Europeans and Americans simply are too reluctant or obtuse to understand. The United States is still the leading military power on a planet-wide basis in general.  Its navy with accompanying air power can go anywhere, anytime and push anyone out of the way. No one can project military power like the US and no one is going to be able to do so for a very long time. In the wrong hands, as we have seen, that has been a problem.  But, there is simply no competition.

Nevertheless, on land and in foreign affairs, it is a different matter. The ill-conceived war in Iraq and the seemingly endless war in Afghanistan have drained the power of the United States militarily, economically and politically.  The policies of the neo-cons and the far right in the US have destroyed the “city on the hill” image that Ronald Reagan tried to push both domestically and internationally. The eight year Bush administration buried the credibility, economy and good will felt toward the US with its astonishingly arrogant, incompetent (but unsurprising) foreign policy otherwise known as the ‘go-it-alone’, ‘with us or against us’ and ‘international agreements be damned’ posturing. 

Second, the European Union remains a creation with enormous potential; but the failure to push for more political integration is now fraying the edges of its economic foundation.  If it is able to resolve the fiscal issues of its member states fairly, then the opportunity to conduct a unified foreign policy will have a chance.  It is not, in my opinion, likely.  Which is why the EU is not included in my list as an entity – just a few member states.

Third, a seismic event could reverse the trend toward the nation-centric foreign policy of pre-1939. I believe in the improbable and dismiss facile bell curves, models and forecasts based on hindsight. It’s what you have dismissed as improbable that will hurt you – usually badly.  The fiscal crises which began in 2008 could have been such an event and should not have been unforeseen, but that moment has dissipated with the uneven recovery – some countries doing much better than others such as in the case of Germany which unfortunately, also proceeded to vocally relegate some member states –the southern tier and Greece in particular - to second citizen status with some distasteful,  nationalistic  remarks bordering on bigotry.   

So, on a region by region basis I believe we are looking at an old, new world order.  It may last a decade or fifty years.  My bet is that it will last longer than anyone expects.  Its structure is that of the realpolitik world of pre-1939 which largely came crashing to a bloody end in 1945 with the rise of the blocs. Some blocs are still around but in reality began a rapid disintegration with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Viewing the political map from this geo-political perspective, there are several clear, locally powerful players – China and India; Russia; Turkey; Germany and France; the Visegrad group; and, of course, the US.  Oh – and BRIC is not a bloc – it is a label of convenience mostly for economists who, like Linus and his blanket, need to pigeon-hole un-related countries into nice chewable morsels. 

I have not included Iran because, compared to the others and despite the hysterics of the galactically stupid right wing in the US, it simply doesn’t count.  Its economy is in shambles and it is politically unstable and cannot risk going to war or cutting off the Strait of Hormuz because that would invite retaliation of the most unpleasant sort by almost everyone.  It’s not near to building a single nuclear bomb and couldn’t afford to toss it in any direction even it did manage that amazingly difficult task because then it would be wiped out.

I did not include any African country because, well, if you can name one that is a regional power with enough influence both economically and militarily to do anything with significant impact except very locally, you win a cookie.  South Africa is the sub-Sahara elephant in the room– but its absurd attempts to play on the world stage as it has in Libya make it more of an annoying busybody than effective player.  The African Union in general is an old boys’ club intent on maintaining the status quo. Just look at the lack of effective condemnation of Mugabe’s reign by the AU. 

I also do not include any South American country despite my strong temptation to present Brazil as a player.  Maybe soon, but not now.

That’s my pre-amble.  Next time, and as a first choice, let’s look at Turkey or, more to the point, how Turkey looks at everyone else and their reaction.

This Can't Be Good...

Lesson learned - if you are the leader of a country in turmoil, don't leave for a foreign trip if you expect to stay in power. 

Prime Minister Saad Hariri of Lebanon is now a caretaker courtesy of Hezbollah.  Hezbollah toppled the government over a long-running dispute linked to a U.N. probe into the 2005 assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri which is poised to indict several Hezbollah members for their involvement.  Hezbollah has been threatening that if Hariri did not disavow the investigation then they would take action. 

Syria is Hezbollah's main ally through which it receives money and other support from Iran.  Iran needs Hezbollah to keep its foot in the door in the Levant and to threaten Israel. The scene is about to become a lot more complex and dangerous.

What is Syria's interest here?  First and foremost, it sees Lebanon as Syrian - perhaps no longer physically, but certainly politically.  But Hezbollah, which has served Syrian interests, is dead in the water without Iran. Syria is going to have to make a choice between its interests and those of Hezbollah and Iran.

If Hezbollah succeeds in seizing control of the government, Syria may be faced with the unpalatable choice of reducing its support to Hezbollah by constricting its supplies or another Israeli assault which could easily suck in Damascus. From a geo-political standpoint, Syria should not want Iran to increase its footprint. Some sort of Syrian intervention is going to be necessary, but likely will not come until after the UN indictments. Then, Syria has its excuse.

Turkey may also become involved both to increase its influence at the expense of Iran and reduce tensions to avoid a military escalation. But it remains to be seen what influence Turkey can actually muster.

I find it hard to believe that Hezbollah is indulging in the type of power play that might result in a severe problem for itself and Syria. However, this is Lebanon where nothing is clear-cut.

Simplistic Thinking on Turkey and Armenia

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The normalization process between Turkey and Armenia has stalled – to put it mildly. But I don’t think the remarks here juxtaposing the peace sculpture (however ugly or not) erected in Kars in Eastern Turkey with the stalled effort (which was not conceived solely in Washington as is stated) at normalization between the two countries as representative of  foreign policy folly, as the author states. You need to go to the VOA web-site to read the entire article which clearly sets forth what happened and the diverse opinions involved as well as the election considerations at the time in Turkey.


Let’s get something straight here. The NK issue needs to be resolved to the satisfaction of both Baku and Yerevan. It is precisely the interference of those diaspora living comfortably in the West which constitutes the roadblock to any type of compromise. No one wants another war and it is unlikely to occur unless Russia allows it. Anyone who thinks that Moscow does not hold the key to a settlement (or anything else in the Caucuses) is a foreign policy naïf.

Ankara's Dilemma

Iran is again in the news as Hillary Clinton, in Dubai on the first stop of a three-nation tour of the Persian Gulf, said the Arab world should act to sharpen enforcement of the sanctions and reject attempts to stoke Mideast tensions. She also said that if Iran succeeds in developing an atomic bomb, it will plunge the Mideast into a disastrous nuclear arms race, she said. "It is first and foremost in the interest of the region to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon." Yet last week, Israel's newly retired spy chief said he thinks Iran won't be able to build a nuclear bomb before 2015.

Yet, a week before the P5-1 talks begin in Istanbul (the 1 being Germany which is not a member of the UN Security Council) with Iran, the emphasis appears to be on the nuclear issue that has clearly subsided in light of the Israeli assessment which was surely known before Meir Dagan, the former Israeli Mossad chief who made the assessment made his statement.

The call for Arab support is nothing new and as the Wikileaks cables show, the drum beater in chief against Iran is Saudi Arabia. But let’s look at what is happening in the region and how the nuclear issue should be relegated to the back of the fridge for a while.

As I have said frequently, much to the boredom of my readers I’m sure, the US has not yet come to grips with the new geo-political reality of the world in which it cannot dictate policy very much to the key players any longer. This applies as much to global powers as it does to regional ones. We are back to the pre-World War I geo-political realities. We know who are the global powers. The regional ones include Turkey and wannabe Iran. There is no regional Arab power since Egypt gave up the mantle after 1973 (although that may be changing).

The general public in the US would likely be shocked to learn that Iran, although Muslim, is not Arab. They, in their usual geo-political vacuum existence and Faux News environment, probably also do not realize that Turkey, although Muslim, is not Arab. Few people understand (more than before, I think as a result of the Iraq fiasco) that Sunni Muslims are not exactly on the same side as Shiite Muslims. They probably do remember that Turkey turned down fearless leader Junior Bush in his invitation (more like a demand at the time) to join his adventure in Mesopotamia and therefore concluded that Turkey was “looking east” and away from the West. The foundation of Turkey’s opposition is forgotten, if it was ever mentioned. Turkey said that the invasion would destabilize the balance of power in the region and that they were not keen on that idea. They were right. And now it is a truly more difficult region to stabilize.

So what we have now is a realpolitik wake-up call. Iraq has largely, though not entirely, been handed to Iran and return of Moqtada al-Sadr, a pro-Iranian cleric with a private army, cements that in place. The removal of Iraq as an independent force in the region has provided Iran with the opening it needs to pursue a historic dream – the control of the Persian Gulf (Arabian Gulf if you happen to be in Saudi Arabia). That is why the Sunni Saudis are so alarmed. The US is withdrawing and the only game in town is Iran, it seems. Nuclear weapons are not the problem. With the US out, Iran has the most powerful conventional military in the region – except for Turkey. But Iran is a lot closer to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates than is Turkey.

The regional balance of power may be at a tipping point in favor of Iran, which makes Israeli policies of apartheid against Palestinians and exchanging Greece for Turkey as an ally even more stupid than they appear on the surface. The current Israeli government now faces the prospect of the EU treating East Jerusalem as the future capital of a Palestinian state and having an EU presence at the demolitions of Palestinian homes, and intervention when peaceful protesters face arrest. All this follows the razing of the famous Shepherds Hotel in East Jerusalem to make way for 20 homes for Jewish settlers (a violation of international law).

The rivalries are just beginning as Turkey begins its reluctant maneuvering to offset Iran and represent all Muslims in the region. I say reluctant because Turkey has said that it will not act as a mediator between Iran and the West. Well, sorry boys. Turkey is going to find it impossible to play any other role. It’s what happens when you become a regional power.

Turkey will need to make decisions that it hates to make – about its neighbors, policies and actions that will not please everyone. The “zero problems” foreign policy only goes so far before national and regional interests force choices. How Turkey handles the upcoming talks with Iran will be a key example of how Turkey plans to exert its influence in Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Geo-politics is forcing Turkey into its natural place in the region as a counterbalance to a surging Persian Iran. It cannot afford to let the vacuum formed by the US withdrawal to result in Iran realizing its dream to control the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

The US will have little influence after leaving Iraq and shows no prospect of dealing with Israeli policies that are self-defeating and which adversely affect US national interests. Iran will negotiate in Istanbul, but further sanctions will do nothing if the results are the status-quo and Iran knows it. It consistently keeps the nuclear issue at center stage because that takes the eyes of the West off the target – which should be prevention of the creation of a regional hegemon at the expense of the West and its fundamental interests. Iran cannot afford for anyone to decide to indulge in an air campaign against its conventional military – which is where its real power lies. Smoke and mirrors – Iran can afford to lose what it does not have.

Which brings us back to the Saudis – who will not be in Istanbul. But it is the Saudi who are most concerned about Iran – and not from the nuclear side of the issue, but the conventional and the shifting balance of power. What is Turkey going to do? It is not in its interests to allow Iran a free hand to establish itself as the sole regional power, able to influence the policies of Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. Turkey cannot simply sit at the negotiating table and play the neutral. It is not neutral and it is in Turkey’s national interests to position itself as the regional power at the expense of Iran.

Welcome to the world of realpolitik, Ankara.

Kurdish Independence

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What would happen if Iraq lost the Kurdish north? The region is already largely autonomous and is a major center of oil reserves. The conventional wisdom is that independence for “Kurdistan” would prompt a military response, sooner or later, from its neighbors – Iran and Turkey. But would it really?


Iran has its hands full with a poor economy, a hostile neighbor – Saudi Arabia – and an unstable Iraq which is proving harder for Iran to manipulate than it expected. It also has larger issues of concern such as a military attack by you-know-who. So, although there is a longstanding conflict that flares now and again between Kurdish nationalists in the northwest of the country and Tehran, it is exceedingly unlikely that Iran would invade northern Iraq if it became independent.

The question is really, what would Ankara do? I suspect that Ankara might welcome an independent Kurdish Republic for several reasons. First, the Kurds in northern Iraq are not actively hostile to Turkey. The PKK is not welcome as a strong presence and indeed is quite worrisome since any cross border attack against Turkish troops has the tendency to provoke a rapid, overwhelming response from Turkey.

An independent Kurdistan might actually gut the PKK movement – much like the establishment of a Palestinian state would seriously undermine Hamas and Hezbollah. Turkey would benefit in its poorest region, the southeast, and tensions would be reduced. Then, there is the oil. Turkey relies heavily on Russian energy supplies for its growing economy. An alternative source would be a welcome event for Turkish foreign policy advisors and would also allow Turkey to increase its influence south and east at the expense of Iran.

Unlikely as it may seem, an independent Kurdish state would not result in an upheaval. However, it is equally unlikely that Baghdad would appreciate the independence of a key part of the country. To avoid the possibility of such a move, I would expect the Iraqi leadership to continue the façade of an integrated nation while at the same time giving the Kurds as much autonomy, short of secession, as they want.

Iraq needs the oil as well.

US Foreign Policy Gains with Recess Appointments

Fortunately, President Obama has finally shown some backbone and made several important recess appointments that are critical for US foreign policy. Three of the key appointments are those of ambassadors to Turkey, Syria and Azerbaijan.

Frank Ricciardone is the new ambassador to Ankara ending five months without representation in Turkey, a key player in the region. In proceeding with the recess appointment President Obama has filled a gaping hole in the ability of America to have a voice on the ground in a critical area of the world. A gaping hole produced by the rank stupidity of the Republicans and their anti-Turkish allies who would sacrifice a relationship with the most powerful and influential country in the region for the pitiful, Russian ally, Armenia.

Similarly, American, not Armenian or Israeli interests, will be served well by the appointment of late Wednesday, Obama announced recess appointments of Matt Bryza to be ambassador to Azerbaijan and Robert Ford to Syria.

Bryza’s confirmation had been put on hold by pro-Armenian Democratic senators Barbara Boxer and Robert Menendez; Obama’s recess-appointment decision was protested by the largest and most influential U.S. Armenian group.

Bryza is a career diplomat but was opposed by some in the Armenian-American community because of comments he made in his previous position as deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs while trying to negotiate an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, an intractable issue largely controlled by Russia.

Aram Hamparian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America said “Armenian-Americans are deeply troubled by President Obama’s decision today to circumvent the U.S. Senate and use a recess appointment to send a deeply flawed diplomat to represent America in Azerbaijan” .

“The president’s push to send Matt Bryza to Baku without Senate approval represents a disservice to American diplomacy that will, sadly, undermine our nation’s ability to advance our interests and values in the Caucasus region”.

Mr. Hamparian, with all due respect, is full of it. Armenia is a Russian ally. It is unbelievably corrupt and undemocratic despite, or perhaps as a result of, being the recipient of hundreds of millions of US aid dollars. It recently signed a treaty with the Russian Federation renewing the military base in Gumri and all its borders are guarded by Russian troops. The California Armenians are very willing to fight to the last local Armenians in defense of retaining the NK as a part of Armenia. Yerevan’s values and interests have nothing to do with Mr. Hamparian’s values and interests. Furthermore, from a geo-political standpoint, keeping Azerbaijan independent of Russia is vastly more important despite it’s less than stellar political system.

For a taste of what Mr. Hamparian is touting as Armenian values, one case currently before the European Court of Human Rights is an appeal to review the case of Armenian opposition activist and former newspaper editor-in-chief Nikol Pashinian.

His attorney filed suit at the Strasbourg court against Pashinian's unjust prosecution, prison conditions and limitations to visiting hours. Pashinian was arrested in 2009 on charges of inciting violence against the authorities and organizing mass unrest on March 1, following a February 2008 election, an election that was questionably handled.

He was convicted by an Armenian court and ordered to serve a 7 year sentence. He is currently being held in Artik prison. Artik prison is an atrocious facility.

Pashinian is the editor-in-chief of the daily Haykakan Zhamanak (The Armenian Times), a popular daily known for its support for Armenia’s first president Levon Ter-Petrosian, and has written a number of severely critical articles about President Serge Sarkisian and his predecessor Robert Kocharian.

His lawyer is not allowed to see his client in private to discuss the course of the trial. This is an open violation of human rights and, I might add, violates even Armenian laws. Further, his wife has claimed that he had been assaulted in prison several times in the last two months by masked people. Having lived and worked in Armenia, I would give this claim credence. She has said she feared for his life and is only allowed to see her husband once a month for four hours.

His situation is just an example of the crippled state of Armenian democracy and how human rights and the freedom of speech are persecuted in the country for the political ends of the few.

And here is another: Armenia has denied a broadcast license to an independent television station, A1+, despite a European Court of Human Rights judgment that previous denials violated freedom of expression, an international Human Rights watchdog reported this week.

"Today's decision is another setback for freedom of expression and information in Armenia," said Giorgi Gogia, South Caucasus researcher at Human Rights Watch. "It's clear that keeping a critic off the air is more important to this government than its international legal obligations.

So when a head of an Armenian-American lobbying group talks about values he needs to take a pill and face reality. It is not in American interests to support an un-democratic Russian ally with delusions of regional importance.

The Turkish appointment is vastly more important than the one to Azerbaijan. Turkey is a NATO member and a balancing force with a vibrant economy and strong military. The Russian Federation actually pays attention to Ankara and as the US has found out, without a voice on the ground it has far less influence in Turkey’s foreign affairs decisions.

Also, from a geo-political standpoint, engaging with Syria is a major component in US middle-eastern foreign policy. As much as the current Israeli government, under the control apparently of its thuggish foreign minister, might prefer to isolate Syria that policy has been a mistake. Syria is intent on regaining what it considers historical control of Lebanon and to that extent is not entirely happy with the level of Iranian intervention through Hezbollah. Turning Syria would only help Israel as nothing gets to Hezbollah from Iran without Syrian acquiescence. Iran knows this as well so the appointment of a US ambassador to Damascus will be of great concern to Tehran.

Good for President Obama.

The Future of NATO to be decided over a Week-end

As NATO meets this week-end in Lisbon, three crucial issues will be on the table.


The first is Afghanistan. The timetable for withdrawal of NATO forces will focus on pace, not if. The rising crescendo of certain politicos in the US that there should be no withdrawal apparently forget that this is a NATO mission, not a US mission regardless of the fact that the majority of troops are American. Decisions in NATO are taken by unanimous consent. A decision not to withdraw is not an option. However, that does not mean that the mission – a decade old, by the way – should not be molded to fit the reality on the ground.

First, as often pointed out by me and others, Afghanistan has not been and will not be a country. It is a largely feudal system of differing tribes, some of whom have more power than others. The mission of NATO and the US in particular, was established as a response to the 9/11 terror attack by Al Qaeda which launched its training and planning from Afghanistan and who were guests of the Taliban. I’m sure there are elements of the Taliban today who wish they had not indulged their cultural traditions quite as much and thrown Al Qaeda out. Nevertheless, NATO has achieved its goal of destroying Al Qaeda Central and the mission needs to consider how to assure that Afghanistan does not become a base for international terrorism again. To do this, it will need to involve Pakistan, Russia, India and (yes) Iran.

NATO, and the US, did not plunge into the Afghan civil war raging at the time in the north between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban for the purpose of nation building. Good governance and civil society building were not part of the writ then and are a long vanished opportunity now. It was a wasted opportunity and short-sighted policy, but the reality is that the Taliban are deeply embedded in society, NATO is going away, and other tribes, particularly in the north, will not be inclined to cooperate with the Taliban alliance. These are the ingredients to a return to an Afghanistan with which all the local participants are very familiar. After NATO vanishes, expect a return to localized tribal war.

That is why NATO needs to discuss the structure of future involvement in Afghanistan, not only among its member states, but also with the surrounding players. It will need to formulate a strategy to deal with potential threats. The Taliban pose zero threat to NATO or any member country. They posed no threat in 2001 and less now. We may decry the return to what most in the West consider barbaric practices; but, aside from complaints, no one in the West was in favor of a massive use of force against the Taliban for their cultural proclivities and abuse of women. Otherwise, NATO might as well invade Saudi Arabia – an unlikely proposition.

NATO, as a body, appears particularly useless at this point in time and its principal mission, defending Europe from the Soviet Union, is not relevant. It must redefine its role and Afghanistan is a good place to start.

The second issue on the table is its relationship with a resurgent Russia. This is complicated by factors that Russia considers important to its foreign policy and its relationship with Europe – such as missile shield deployment and securing its field of influence. NATO has frequently stated that Russia is a partner, not an opponent. Many in the US do not see it that way and may well sink the START Treaty which is supported by the US military and important (thinking) Republicans. If START goes down and they are not included in the decision to deploy a missile shield, expect trouble.

For a start, Moscow may stop cooperating with the United States on Iran and, bearing in mind that Afghanistan will not be over for at least another few years, it may not be so generous with the transit of non –lethal material over its territory to supply NATO troops. It may renew pressure on its “near abroad” through energy supplies and less than subtle political pressure to make sure that NATO – and particularly the US – do not renew the Bush era political invasion of their turf. Finally, if START is not ratified and the Republican leadership succeeds in bringing a return to the confrontational policies of the previous administration with Russia, then Moscow hawks may win the day. So much for the reset button.

Third, and connected to the above is this issue of the missile shield. NATO, through the US, changed its focus from an overtly challenging system aimed at Russia that Bush and his neo-con allies sought to install, to one which is aimed at defending Europe and others from Iranian missiles. NATO will try and force the issue with Turkey for example. It has already asked that Turkey allow anti-missile shields to be placed on its territory. If Turkey says ‘no’, that will lose the second most powerful military to NATO, not to mention an important Muslim ally. If NATO pushes and Turkey says ‘yes’, then its standing in the Middle East will plummet- leaving Iran as the great protector. Ultimately, it is hoped that no specific countries are cited, giving Turkey the cover to place the shield on its soil. Of course, this is not to say that Turkey is not making some serious blunders along the way. The recent demand by Turkey that it be given operational control of the system based on its territory is absurd – but indicates the levels to which Turkey will go to gain respect and leverage in its back-yard. Time for NATO to be clever and devise a satisfactory solution because it would be sad to begin the ritual “who lost Turkey” refrain. Turkey needs to climb down from some of its positions as well.

By the end of the week-end, NATO will need to formulate an approach to the entire Middle East. It should have the wit to see how key Turkey is to the alliance and the West and not permit Israel to dictate policy. Fortunately, there is only one member of the alliance that allows its foreign policy to be directed by Israel. The others are not so inclined.

Finally, aside from specific areas of concern that must be addressed, NATO must redefine itself. It is already largely irrelevant but is unable to dissolve itself. None of its members, even France and Germany and certainly not Poland and the Baltics, want that to happen. Sweden and Finland will likely increase their participation in NATO short of becoming members. So, what is NATO to become? Because, the Cold War is over and political relationships are getting back to normal.

South Caucuses and a Return to Normal Foreign Policy

 

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 In what should be considered another example of a return to “normal” foreign policy choices cited in a previous post, Russia signed a treaty with Armenia that commits it to defend the borders of Armenia proper while in August, Turkey signed a Treaty on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance with Azerbaijan that happens to include the establishment of a military base in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic – an Azerbaijani exclave between Armenia and Turkey. The tacit agreement, with US preoccupation in other regions, is that the South Caucuses (see map) now belongs to Turkey and Russia to work out. Indeed, both the EU and the US seem to have concluded on a period of strategic neglect in the region.

What is interesting about the latest round of treaties vowing to protect the territorial integrities of Azerbaijan and Armenia by, respectively Turkey and Russia (with the notable exception of the Ngorno Kharabakh enclave which both Armenia and Russia studiously avoided), is the return to a 19th and early 20th century diplomacy. These are zones of interest which could be characterized as a return to normalcy after the end of history in 1991. It also represents the collapse of any agreement on Ngorno Kharabakh as the two local players rely on their much more powerful regional allies to assure their relative safety and prevent the conflict from reigniting while retaining the status quo.

Meanwhile, both Turkey and Russia are shepherding a solution to the Ngorno Kharabakh issue by working on bi-lateral meetings between Baku and Yerevan – the first one having been held in the Russian Caspian Sea city of Astrakhan during the last week of October and the next soon to be held at the OSCE conference in Astana. The absence of the EU and the US from this process is telling and another example of a new, old foreign policy system based on regional power.

Follow-up on Turkey

Like most countries, Turkey has a top secret document outlining perceived and actual threats.  In Turkey it's commonly referred to as the "Red Book".  Depending on the  leaks one wants to believe, it includes Iran, Greece (not surprising), Kurdish northern Iraq and climate change as threat factors.  Maybe. It's also less than 20 pages, apparently.

Nevertheless, it is interesting that Iran may be on the list given the "zero problems with neighbors" policy, and supports the complexity of Turkish foreign policy that the media likes to ignore.

Kansas Controls US Foreign Policy

Among the problems with implementing US foreign policy is the ability of a small group of people - or in this case one Republikan - to bring an important posting to a key country to a screaming, tire burning halt. And for no reason or some double super-secret reason or,more likely to pander to whatever group is paying him or her off.

There has been no ambassador to Turkey since last July.  Turkey is a member of NATO.  Even the EU is now warming to it. Now, due to a deal by the "why can't we all get along" Democrats that will never be repeated once the lunatics gain political control in the US, preventing recess appointments , it will not happen for another seven weeks or so. Senator Brownbeck (R - KS) originally put this appointment on hold for no apparent reason other than to please his Bible thumping friends and "punish" Turkey for following a foreign policy that Turkey considers suitable for Turkey and not necessarily for the bought-and-paid-for US Congress.

There are major policy decisions that need to be discussed in the region, including dealing with Russian expansionism, energy, stability in Iraq and dealing with Iran. The petty, childish foot stomping by one senator from Dorothyland puts US foreign policy at risk.

Independent Investigation Launched - Turkish Gaza Flotilla

About time.  Although it will come as a surprise to no one that Israel will refuse to cooperate with the UN on this investgation.

and, speaking of Russia....and the ICJ

The recent advisory opinion by the ICJ regarding Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia will pose a problem for Moscow.  It's statements to the court may come back to haunt it.

Moscow stated that:

General international law prevents Kosovo from declaring independence, bearing in mind that the people of Kosovo do not enjoy a right to self-determination.

Russia rejects claims coming from those countries who support the unilateral declaration that international law "does not regulate independence declarations", and reminds that the UN Security Council declared Northern Cyprus and Rhodesia's independence to be illegal, since secession is forbidden outside the colonial context.

Violations of human rights of Albanians during the 1990s cannot be the justification for a unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.

Russia supported, to the extent of encouraging and sending troops to assist, breakaway regions of Georgia - Abkhasia and S. Ossetia.  At the time of Kosovo's declaration, Russia declared that acceptance would have consequences.  Many commentators pointed to the invasion of Georgia, ostensibly to protect the populations of Abkhasia and S. Ossetia from Georgian ethnic cleansing and prevent Georgia from reasserting central authority, as pay-back for Kosovo.

Yet the position that Russia's ambassador presented to the court does not reflect its positions regarding Georgian sovereignty and spells trouble for Chechnya and other non-Russian regions of the Federation.

It's first statement, that general international law does not allow Kosovar independence because the people have no right of self determination is not, in fact and law, true.  The court had previously decided in the case of East Timor that the right of self-determination exists in all circumstances under the fundamental principle of jus cogens - a principle of international law which is accepted by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted.  Russia needs to consider the impact of this position on Chechnya.

The second point refers to a legal position that such unilateral declarations of independence can only be asserted within a colonial context.  This argument has been raised before, but has no general support in international law.  In any case, the advisory opinion distinguishes the Kosovo declaration as not an issue between nation states, but an internal matter which was triggered by the stripping of all of Kosovo's rights under the Yugoslav constitution under the Milosevic regime.  If Russia wants to pursue this position of independence only within a colonial context, how far back should we look?  Chechnya could, arguably, be considered a colonial possession, conquered and re-conquered several times in the  19th century by imperial Russia.  On the other hand, the Russian argument fails if applied to Abkhasia and S. Ossetia since they could not be considered colonies, ever, of Georgia.

Citing Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus in support of the illegality of the unilateral declaration of independence, Russia ignored the unique circumstances of each of those actions one of which involved the attempt to continue an oppressive colonial regime and the other which is political in nature. The political component is ignored by those, like Russia, who tend not to differentiate between the court's ruling which recognized the legality of the declaration as opposed to political recognition.  This is crucial for Cyprus, where the Greeks are opposing opening of any new chapters in EU accession talks for Turkey despite the commitment of the EU to do so based on the 2004 vote by Turkish Cypriots to reunite the island, while the Greeks voted it down. Only Turkey recognizes Northern Cyprus - a very similar situation to that faced by Russia in Abkhasia and S. Ossetia which have been recognized by Venezuela, Nicaragua and some insignificant island in the Pacific. Politically, it is unlikely that Northern Cyprus will be recognized as independent by anyone other than Turkey even if an argument can be made for legal recognition.

Kosovo is recognized, so far, by 69 countries, including the US, Germany and Turkey. Politics matters.  Citing Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus is an unwise legal position since both can be used to show the illegality of Abkhazia's and S. Ossetia's unilateral declarations.

Violation of human rights in the 1990s cannot be used as a reason for Independence in 2004 - the next argument put forward by Russia.  However, the court did not rely on the violation of human rights as the basis of its decision. Rather, it pointed to the stripping of constitutional rights granted to other regions of Yugoslavia - a position successfully put forward by Croatia.  Conversely, violation of human rights is precisely the argument used by Russia to inject troops in support of the Abkhazian and S. Ossetian independence movements. 

Despite the frequent admonitions that Kosovo is a unique situation and not precedent - admonitions made by Russia, Turkey (with it's eye on the Kurds in northern Iraq), the UK, US and Germany (in recent statements in Cyprus), it will be used as precedent.  But it will be politics, not international law that will govern the outcome.