Russia Makes its Moves

A decision by the Kremlin to pay a naval visit to Syria as reported in Izvestia spells trouble.  Russia is clearly ramping up its position regarding what it sees as encirclement redux by the West.  Sending its flagship aircraft carrier the "Admiral Kuznetsov" along with a patrol ship, an anti-submarine craft and other vessels is a signal to NATO that Russia is willing to irritate the West - such as threatening to shut down the supply line to Afghanistan as well - to assert its resurgent foreign policy. 

Aside from the natural position of any country to protect its interests, the move to send a naval contingent to Syria is curious because the blow-back to Russian economic interests in Syria could be serious in long run.  Assad is going down and it is unlikely that the new government will recall the support given to him by the visiting ships with any fondness.  It may have been pre-planned, but it was not cancelled, and under the circumstances is a supremely stupid move by Moscow. Defending one's interests is one thing - supporting a bloody murderer is another. Not that the Russians don't have a history of supporting people like Assad - just look to Serbia. 

The other somewhat provocative move is the recent threat to cut off the supply route to NATO troops in Afghanistan.  Coupled with this weeks border closure by Pakistan, this could spell real trouble.  NATO is withdrawing anyway and the logic of the threat speaks more to the perceived and somewhat real containment of Russia by the US in Eastern Europe.  But, again, such a threat, if implemented, would affect real NATO interests and lives.  This would be a profoundly dumb move by the Kremlin unless it actually desires a return to the cold war - one it did not win. 

The timing of the threats from another standpoint is also curious. The US is Russia's greatest competitor. It is withdrawing from Afghanistan and has largely completed its withdrawal from Iraq.  Russian ability to reign-in its near-abroad depended on the window of opportunity provided by the distraction caused by those two wars.  The window is almost shut and the US will have more opportunity to shift its foreign policy focus away from these wars, much to the detriment of Russian foreign policy should it continue on this course. 

It is difficult to understand the choices that are made by those in power in Russia regarding how they protect their interests.  They certainly have other leverage points but appear to be deliberately choosing those that maximize the chance of long-term damage in relations with the West - a partner they desperately need.  The imminent re-assumption of power by Vladimir Putin coupled with militaristic muscle flexing does not auger well for future.

Russia - In the National Interest

Image via WikipediaRussia has problems and it knows it.  But, the end of the US centric world has given Russia the opportunity to reassert itself as a major player in the Eurasia theater, but just barely and perhaps only for a limited time.  The policies of Peter the Great are back.

Russia looks to Europe and the West, but not as it did in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  After Yeltsin came Putin whose vision was to reassemble the broken state, create a highly centralized governance system and stamp out overt displays of democratic aspirations through the supremacy of the FSB (formerly KGB) in the political food chain.  None of this is surprising in hindsight because Russia proper was historically indefensible and needed either buffer territory or client states to surround its core and strong central government. 

Imperial Russia carved out an empire in Central Asia, the Caucuses and East Asia which was simply transferred over to the Soviet Union, albeit with considerable bloody fighting in these regions between 1918 and 1922 when it was re-conquered for a second time.  The buffer proved invaluable for defeating Nazi Germany in a variety of ways, not the least of which was room to retreat, a place for industry out of reach of enemies and an unlimited source of cannon fodder. 

Putin served the Soviet Union as part of the KGB and his inheritance was an imperial Russia with major losses in Central Asia, the Baltic States, the Caucuses and East Asia (Mongolia), a pathetically weak military, collapsed industrial capacity (most of it was located in the now independent Ukraine), unrest in the Northern Caucuses (Chechnya in particular), unconstrained oligarchs who had divided state assets under privatization and a depressed public.  It was a mess.

Any sober Russian leader knows that Russia is surrounded by some pretty hefty neighbors with no natural barriers while the country outside the western Russian core consists of multiple ethnic groups with a dislike of Moscow. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the internal economy that sustained it (badly).  It’s major asset is energy, but it has a poor infrastructure network in general and needs foreign assistance, particularly in technology.  This is a daunting task for any Russian leader.

Russia, historically and for good reason, does not trust its neighbors.  But since Europe is so much more advanced in almost every sector Russians – or at least their leaders – realize that aggressiveness must be tempered with accommodation.   In the A.Y.  period (After Yeltsin), Vladimir Putin aggressively went about securing absolute power and restoring Russian prestige in the world as he saw it.  Russians were ecstatic and felt that, at least as far as  the “near abroad” (all the former Soviet colonies) was concerned, Russian pre-eminence was achieved.  He was seen as pro-Western abroad and a strong leader at home.  As Russia internally became authoritarian and the nascent democracy was crushed with the help of an energy dependent Europe and a distracted US (Bush saw into Putin’s soul, felt comradeship and invaded Iraq – another story), Putin led Russia in a great charm campaign with Europe and the US. 

Frankly, this is not much different from any other country in the prosecution of foreign/domestic policies.  It’s ok to be nice abroad when the perceived strength of the country is high.  Weak countries tend to be more unpredictable and prone to accidents.  Although Putin’s internal and international reputation suffered as he became more dictatorial, it didn’t matter internally because the majority felt that he had restored Russian greatness and stature.  He also leveled Grozny.

Dmitri Medvedev, the current and soon to be ex-president, was welcomed as a friend of the West.  Again, appearances were deceptive.  Medvedev is charming, most of the time, and probably understands Europe and the US better than KGB trained Putin. But when push came to shove, Russia’s national interests logically came first and securing the borders for buffer zones against any outside threat was still a priority.  Georgia, ignoring every signal not to poke the bear (who had already said – repeatedly - how much it disliked Georgia’s president) felt the consequences of that policy.  Small surrounding countries made a note.

Leaders are rarely of a single personality and both Medvedev and Putin put the national interests of Russia first which results in accommodation or aggressiveness as the case may be. The distraction of the US, first in Afghanistan and then in the illegal war in Iraq gave Moscow a ten year scope of maneuver which it used to destroy democratic tendencies, kill off journalists opposed to the regime and consolidate power within the country followed quickly by changing the  dynamics in the near abroad without a murmur of objection from the US or the West.  The result was a profound disillusionment in the West with Putin, but no action because the only country that could counter Russia’s moves was tied up in the personal wars of Bush and the abandonment of countries like Ukraine by Europe.

When Medvedev became President and Putin reverted to Prime Minister, nothing changed. Indeed, without blinking and largely due to the thundering stupidity of the Saakashvili, president of Georgia, he quickly launched the war against Georgia the result of which was a foregone conclusion despite the poor and sometimes astoundingly incompetent performance of the army and air-force.   It was the perfect war to help secure an important part of the Russian southern flank and blunt Turkish influence.  The refusal of Azerbaijan to bend to Russian pressure, however, makes this victory somewhat less than it could be in the Caucuses as does the continuing unrest and unremitting anger in Georgia. 

The overthrow of the Bakaiv government in Kyrgyzstan, which had gained control in a color revolution but which quickly degenerated into a kleptocracy, was supported by Moscow – and  by the West for different reasons, but the geo-political results were favourable to Russia. As far as Russian historical security policy toward its neighbors is concerned, the outcomes were pretty good. 

Finally, there is Ukraine. Russia can do without the Baltics, although it has threatened them frequently, especially when Medvedev said that Russia has the right to protect Russians wherever they happen to be. Ukraine, however, is a different matter. Russia was caught off guarded with the Orange Revolution and the visit by Putin just before the fraudulent election angered both Yanukovich and Yuschenko supporters as an unwarranted interference in Ukrainian politics.  However,  Russia without Ukraine is indefensible.  NATO touches its borders in the Baltics and now has NATO members Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea.  The expansion of NATO was beginning to look like an encirclement coupled with the Manas air base in Bishkek. A NATO aligned Ukraine would be a disaster.

In short, Russia cannot do without the food, infrastructure (pipelines to Europe), or the port of Sevastopol  for the Black Sea fleet. Geographically without Ukraine Russia is looking into a black hole of poverty and marginalization. The defeat of the Orange Revolution with the election of Yanukovich ended the threat of Western penetration into the Russian heartland. This victory in Ukraine changed the attitude of every Russian neighbor. Conciliation and cooperation with Moscow is now the flavour of the day.  The West must now learn to deal with a dictatorial puppet regime in Ukraine, which will only be removed by revolution, similar to the absurd notion in the Soviet period of allowing Ukraine a seperate seat in the UN.

Moscow knows it has a small window of opportunity to achieve its goal of internal control and secure borders.  With the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, negotiated by Bush and being implemented by Obama, and the wind-down of Afghanistan, the room to maneuver for the Kremlin has narrowed.  However, now that it is feeling strong and secure - and knowing that demographically it is losing ground it allows the government to move closer to the West to obtain the technology it desperately needs. Historically, Russia has always followed this pattern.  This time, however, may be different because investors’ memories are longer.

Nevertheless, so far the Russian balancing act of building strength internally through the Potemkin village of managed democracy and threatening aggressiveness in the near abroad is working.  Moscow has extended its control through strategic relationships in Europe, particularly with Berlin whose need for Russian energy is Moscow’s trump card.  This secures the Western front, at least for the near future both politically and economically.

Finally, the customs and trade union conceived in Moscow, is not – as it alleges – to re-create the EU trade system, but to tie Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus close to the Kremlin.  The economic union is only a step in the search by Russia for security through control. 

Nevertheless, as the window closes, Russia still has resistance from Azerbaijan and Georgia and faces continuing unrest in the north Caucuses.  The Baltics are not exactly friendly.  Poland, despite its moves to normalize political relations with Moscow, mistrusts Russia and Germany and has helped to form the Visegrad Group with the Baltic states whose primary goal is to forge a military alternative to NATO.  As previously mentioned, Russia's demographics is not enviable.  Russia's balance between cooperation and confrontation will continue for some time and will always reflect national interests.

One last observation.  On September 24 Putin announced he would be running for President to replace Medvedev.  These are not, of course, elections.  Nevertheless, two days afterwards, Medvedev’s public and nasty firing of the deputy prime minister and Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin revealed more of the internal politics of the Kremlin than would normally be the case. 

Medvedev was not happy at being treated like a seat warmer for Putin.  During the meeting he referred to decisions  he had made and the fact that he was in charge.  Unfortunately, with the musical chair now back to Putin, it is clear that his decisions and positions were irrelevant.  Not only that.  Russia does not seem to be going anywhere economically (aside from energy and without Western help) and certainly not democratically.   The idea that Putin will be running the show until 2024 is not appetizing; but from the view of the Kremlin, it is the only choice.

Medvedev's Shot Across the Bow of the SS Putin

Al Jazeera is reporting as I sit here that President Dmitry Medvedev said Russia could face civil war or stagnation if too much power was concentrated in the hands of one man, an apparent jibe at the prime minister, Vladimir Putin.

 

Keep in mind that there is a presidential vote in March 2012.  Neither has announced, but it is beginning to look like a showdown.

 

Here's the money quote in response to a question about parliamentary democracy:

"An excessive concentration of power is indeed a dangerous thing: it has happened in this country many times and as a rule it has either led to stagnation or civil war.

We must not allow that. Attempts to build up power to fit a certain individual are dangerous. If they do not cause trouble today, you must not doubt that they will cause great problems for the country and for the individual in the not-too-distant future. We must think about this and remember the lessons of history."

This is the second veiled attack. The first came earlier this year, when Mr Medvedev slapped down Mr Putin for criticising western military intervention in Libya and then ordered Putin allies to leave the boards of state companies such as Rosneft.

Is Russia becoming interesting again?

Russia's Roosting Chickens

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Much to my surprise, Brussels (but more likely Berlin) has been working tirelessly and quietly to remove the burden of Russian control over Europe’s (but actually Germany’s) severe dependence on gas from Siberia.

The European Union and Azerbaijan signed a deal Thursday in which Baku commits to supply Europe with "substantial volumes of gas," an agreement the EU said was an important step to reduce the bloc's dependence on deliveries from Russia.

Russia has used its energy resources as a weapon – not necessarily directly against Europe, but targeting Ukraine and Belarus. The strategy is aimed, and has largely succeeded, in assisting Moscow’s initial key foreign policy goals of regaining control of Ukraine and maintaining a thumb on Minsk. In doing so, however, Moscow alarmed Europe which needed to reduce gas imports from Russia before Russia began to use that same leverage to pressure the EU into ever more pro-Russian positions. The Kremlin’s energy gambit would allow it to loosen the support given by the EU to the Baltics, Poland and reduce other EU initiatives in the Caucuses and Central Asia. France, but not Germany, is immune to Russian pressure because of its huge nuclear energy facilities (a technology in which it is now the world leader).

The Russian move to bring Ukraine and the Caucuses back under its control was a key foreign policy goal of the Kremlin. The Russian Federation is a shell without Ukraine and the Caucuses is a buffer zone, like Belarus. The methods, however, were Putin’s. Without compunction, Putin’s Russia blatantly interfered in Ukrainian elections, invaded Georgia, signed virtually permanent military agreements with Armenia (outflanking Georgia and the West) and used disputes over gas pricing and transit fees with Ukraine to cut off gas supplies which happened to flow west. Europe, much to my surprise I admit, got the point and has started taking some action.

The faux democracy, single media environment of Russia built by Putin is now seeing some of its egg layers home to roost and one of them is named Nabucco.

Russia Plans Massive Population Shift - Development Agencies Begin Drooling

Get your attention?

This is about a week old, but Agence-France-Press (behind subscription wall) has reported that Russia plans a “major population shake-up”. If that sounds alarming – well, it isn’t. Aside from a misleading headline which, I must admit, prompted me to open the article, the population shake-up is in the form of a policy that hopes to reverse the Stalin era effort to urbanize everything that was not cemented in place already.


A new, not-so-secret, government paper recommends a plan to concentrate the bulk of Russia’s people in 20 urban centers rather than scattered across the country. The document says that developing small towns with a population of less than 100,000 people (90 percent of Russia's towns) had no perspective in the future and conditions should be created to speed up migration from small towns to larger centers. The document warned, however, that if the process was carried out in a disorganized fashion there could be serious risks for the state due to imbalances between regions. I’d add – among other things.

In perhaps one of the biggest understatement of the year, a government official said “Changing the map of the country is a necessary but not simple task which needs to be done very carefully as any overreaction could lead to a fight for urban resources".

Why is this at all relevant to anything – I mean aside from the shear scope of the concept which seems very Stalinesque in nature?

Think of the development assistance Moscow may source to implement a project of this magnitude. The World Bank, USAID and EC could be at the feeding trough for decades assisting the Russians in the planning and execution of the plan. And then, mid-way, re-thinking, re-designing and re-implementing the project – something development agencies have perfected over the past thirty or forty year under the theory that there is never enough time to do it right, but always enough to do it twice.

Seriously, once President Medvedev announces the secret plan I will bet the ranch that international development professionals – from experts in administration, transportation, land policy and urban planning to environmental protection and family planning – will be beating down all the Kremlin gates.

Hell, it’ll be like an annuity.

Multiculturalism Fail

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German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared on Oct. 16 at a meeting of her party, the Christian Democratic Union, that multiculturalism, “has failed totally.” This is merely stating the obvious as the failure to integrate non-Germans into society was quite clear a very long time ago. The same can be said of France and all the other members of the old EU to one degree or another.


Horst Seehofer, minister-president of Bavaria and the chairman of a sister party to the Christian Democrats, said at the same meeting that the two parties were “committed to a dominant German culture and opposed to a multicultural one.” The reference to a dominant German culture is striking, for obvious reasons. However, the phenomenon is not confined to Germany as right wing populists gain in the polls, much as in the US. In this context, it is clear that immigration issues are affecting all of Europe and the response is not pleasant.

Of course, much of the reaction to immigration is driven by the deteriorating economies of Europe (although Germany is doing rather well despite a shortage of highly trained specialists). But, the perceived problem in Germany is of its own making.

Germany’s labor shortage began, again for obvious reasons, following World War II. So it began to import some skilled, but largely unskilled, labor from other European countries. These workers were referred to as “guest workers” and they came from Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey. They were considered temporary, as the name implies, not immigrants. Most returned as expected and in any event Germany had no plan for assimilation. Furthermore, Germans could now rely on the unskilled migrant workers to perform, well, unskilled and rudimentary jobs, thereby allowing Germans to move into far less menial positions.

Germany had a very liberal policy for the guest workers – including social benefits and the ability to bring in family members to join the already large number of migrants. Guess which migrants took advantage of this the most. Turks. And not Turks from the cosmopolitan west of Turkey or Istanbul, but from the very poor east. The Turkish community became permanent, raising families and, as the economy slumped, taking advantage of a very liberal German social safety net as they became un-employed.

Germany never wanted to assimilate any of the guest workers, but their own policies created a situation where they needed to do something. So they came up with the smoke and mirrors multi-culturalism solution. It seemed a great idea at the time, but contained a time bomb because the deal was that the guest workers (and at this point this really only included the Turkish population) could retain their cultural and social beliefs but had to pledge loyalty to Germany. This ended up creating a sub-class – a sort of separate but equal system – which did not share (and were not required to share) German values.

As I said earlier, this is not solely a German prediliction. Europeans in general have no idea how to assimilate different cultures. Germany, like France, hid its head in the sand and, until now, never defined what it meant to be German. There was never a core culture that the immigrants were required to accept in return for citizenship - a contract of shared values. Multi-culturalism is not dead because it never was alive in the first place. The German (and French) view was a pretence and merely created ghettos. Is it surprising that after being made second class persons that Turks in particular considered Turkey their home to which they owed loyalty?

For the Germans to claim failure now is a little like the shock – shock – that Greece lied about its finances in order to enter the Euro zone or that the unregulated, shadow banks in the US precipitated the latest economic crash.

But the current German view points to a broader issue. The fact that Germany is using the language of nationalism is, to put it mildly, a little alarming. Germany is looking beyond the old constraints that tied it to the Western defense and economic establishments, including the EU. Back to the future.

Germany already has the closest economic ties to Russia of any Western European state. Russia ties Germany to itself with energy and Germany provides investment to Russia. There is already the shadow of a political alliance. The Baltic States and Poland should view this developing relationship with alarm. So should the US.

The outcome the last time Germany talked up national interest was not at all agreeable.

The Kremlin vs Minsk

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There is a fierce war of words erupting between the former state farm directory President Lukashenko of Belarus and President Medvedev and PM Putin of Russia.  Medvedev has harshly criticised Lukashenko of Russia-bashing in his re-election campaign.  In a video blog entry posted on the Kremlin web site on Sunday, Medvedev accused Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko of trying to cast Russia as his nation's main enemy while running for re-election. 

The economic union among Belarus, Russian and Khazakhstan has been delayed for more than six months.  There are numerous reasons for this, including the global economic crises. But also figuring into the equation is Russian's aggressive expansion at the expense of Georgia, bullying of Ukraine with threats that the same type of independence movement could strike in the Crimea, and the suspicion that it engineered  the coup in the Kyrgyz Republic.  All this has made countries like Belarus - regardless of its less than democratic government - move closer to the EU in terms of cooperation. It has not helped Lukashenko's position in the Kremlin that Belarus has refused to recognize S. Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent of Georgia, thereby joining the ranks of Venezuela, Nicaragua and some tiny atoll in the Pacific.

Lukashenko has oppositon, but it is usually not effective.  The question is if Moscow will throw its weight, overtly, behind any other contender for the thrown of Minsk.  The last time they did that, their man in Kyiv went down to defeat and they have failed miserably in Georgia trying to unseat their least favourite president.

and, speaking of Russia....and the ICJ

The recent advisory opinion by the ICJ regarding Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia will pose a problem for Moscow.  It's statements to the court may come back to haunt it.

Moscow stated that:

General international law prevents Kosovo from declaring independence, bearing in mind that the people of Kosovo do not enjoy a right to self-determination.

Russia rejects claims coming from those countries who support the unilateral declaration that international law "does not regulate independence declarations", and reminds that the UN Security Council declared Northern Cyprus and Rhodesia's independence to be illegal, since secession is forbidden outside the colonial context.

Violations of human rights of Albanians during the 1990s cannot be the justification for a unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.

Russia supported, to the extent of encouraging and sending troops to assist, breakaway regions of Georgia - Abkhasia and S. Ossetia.  At the time of Kosovo's declaration, Russia declared that acceptance would have consequences.  Many commentators pointed to the invasion of Georgia, ostensibly to protect the populations of Abkhasia and S. Ossetia from Georgian ethnic cleansing and prevent Georgia from reasserting central authority, as pay-back for Kosovo.

Yet the position that Russia's ambassador presented to the court does not reflect its positions regarding Georgian sovereignty and spells trouble for Chechnya and other non-Russian regions of the Federation.

It's first statement, that general international law does not allow Kosovar independence because the people have no right of self determination is not, in fact and law, true.  The court had previously decided in the case of East Timor that the right of self-determination exists in all circumstances under the fundamental principle of jus cogens - a principle of international law which is accepted by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted.  Russia needs to consider the impact of this position on Chechnya.

The second point refers to a legal position that such unilateral declarations of independence can only be asserted within a colonial context.  This argument has been raised before, but has no general support in international law.  In any case, the advisory opinion distinguishes the Kosovo declaration as not an issue between nation states, but an internal matter which was triggered by the stripping of all of Kosovo's rights under the Yugoslav constitution under the Milosevic regime.  If Russia wants to pursue this position of independence only within a colonial context, how far back should we look?  Chechnya could, arguably, be considered a colonial possession, conquered and re-conquered several times in the  19th century by imperial Russia.  On the other hand, the Russian argument fails if applied to Abkhasia and S. Ossetia since they could not be considered colonies, ever, of Georgia.

Citing Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus in support of the illegality of the unilateral declaration of independence, Russia ignored the unique circumstances of each of those actions one of which involved the attempt to continue an oppressive colonial regime and the other which is political in nature. The political component is ignored by those, like Russia, who tend not to differentiate between the court's ruling which recognized the legality of the declaration as opposed to political recognition.  This is crucial for Cyprus, where the Greeks are opposing opening of any new chapters in EU accession talks for Turkey despite the commitment of the EU to do so based on the 2004 vote by Turkish Cypriots to reunite the island, while the Greeks voted it down. Only Turkey recognizes Northern Cyprus - a very similar situation to that faced by Russia in Abkhasia and S. Ossetia which have been recognized by Venezuela, Nicaragua and some insignificant island in the Pacific. Politically, it is unlikely that Northern Cyprus will be recognized as independent by anyone other than Turkey even if an argument can be made for legal recognition.

Kosovo is recognized, so far, by 69 countries, including the US, Germany and Turkey. Politics matters.  Citing Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus is an unwise legal position since both can be used to show the illegality of Abkhazia's and S. Ossetia's unilateral declarations.

Violation of human rights in the 1990s cannot be used as a reason for Independence in 2004 - the next argument put forward by Russia.  However, the court did not rely on the violation of human rights as the basis of its decision. Rather, it pointed to the stripping of constitutional rights granted to other regions of Yugoslavia - a position successfully put forward by Croatia.  Conversely, violation of human rights is precisely the argument used by Russia to inject troops in support of the Abkhazian and S. Ossetian independence movements. 

Despite the frequent admonitions that Kosovo is a unique situation and not precedent - admonitions made by Russia, Turkey (with it's eye on the Kurds in northern Iraq), the UK, US and Germany (in recent statements in Cyprus), it will be used as precedent.  But it will be politics, not international law that will govern the outcome.

Civil War in the Kyrgyz Republic

I am at a loss why Russian President Medvedev suggested that civil war was near in the Kyrgyz Republic (the official name by the way - I'm looking at you CNN - oh, and while am at it
CNN Ukraine is simply Ukraine - not "the" Ukraine unless you like "the" France or "the" Italy - it's not a province of Russia any longer!).  I digress.

In any event, the only reason Medvedev could possibly have thought to bring this up was to increase the possibility of an offer to send Russian peacekeepers. Just like the TransDniester and South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

They.Never.Leave.

Civil war is nearly impossible.  The stronghold of the ex-president and his first-son is in the south -specifically in Jalal' abad with a population of 12 and several chickens.  (OK, it's really around 70,000 people but I stand by my chicken count - I saw them). Osh is Uzbek and Bakiyev will have little support there. The north and south a seperated by a small range of mountains exceeding 4000 meters. It becomes hard to get at each others' throats with that type of barrier.  In the middle lies Naryn - the Kyrgyz heartland. They are not about to side with Bakiyev et al.

Medvedev is being the set-up man for intervention. Again.  I suggest that he look to his own backyard in the North Caucuses before expanding military adventures on questionable efforts. He's in Washington now. Perhaps he has heard of Iraq and Afghanistan? He can talk about adventures.

Confusion in the Kyrgyz Republic

Following up on the events in the Kyrgyz Republic, the cause of the successful revolt does appear to be grounded solidly on the intensity of anger, building up over the past three years, over the dashed hopes for reform ushered in by the Tulip Revolution. The latter revolt elevated the now ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to a leadership role that quickly degenerated into a kleptocracy of extraordinary magnitude spearheaded by his son, Maxim.


Maxim sold off the resources of the country and pocketed the funds for himself and his family. He sold water to Uzbekistan far beyond the Kyrgyz Republic's resources and electricity to, of all places, the Republic of Kazakhstan. The water sold could have been used to generate electricity rather than endure the twice daily power shedding that occurred in 2006 leaving even the capital, Bishkek, in the dark. He then raised electric rates by 170% as well as cell phone rates and pocketed that as well. In 2006 I witnessed his thugs cut down the surrounding two meter metal fence from the grounds on the Hyatt in retaliation for the hotel's refusal to increase his percentage ownership of the casino. The purported reason? So the public could visit the monument in the park without the need to pass security. The man needed to be removed - one way or another.

Bakiyev did nothing to stop the deterioration of the economy while indulging in conspicuous consumption and, on days he was bored, murdering journalists. Little has been done to find and punish the murderers of Alisher Saipov (killed in 2007), Almazbek Tashiev (2009) and Gennady Pavlyuk (also 2009). More than 60 cases of assaults on journalists have been reported since Bakiyev took control in 2005.

I am also sure that Moscow was not pleased after bribing him with a $2 billion loan channeled through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to close Manas airbase to NATO and then watching as the US outbid the bribe and he broke his promise to close the base and then suggested that he would give the US a second base.

This brings up the issue as to whether the revolt that toppled the government was aided by Russia. President Putin immediately called interim the president and promising support and aid. Meanwhile, in the US, the State Department in another example of saying too much when asked to comment implied that it was working with Bakiyev. Philip Crowley said,

We work with that sitting government. We have — as we’ve outlined in various reports, including the Human Rights Report — we have concerns about issues, intimidation by the government, corruption within the government…but that said, there is a sitting government. We work closely with that government. We are allied with that government in terms of its support for international operations in Afghanistan.

How about, "We urge calm and restraint on all sides to avoid further bloodshed". Period. Rumours are flying about in Bishkek, according to my former colleagues that Maxim has fled to the US. Not.Very.Helpful. Russia is viewed as helpful. The United States as a supporter of a corrupt regime.

Finally, domestic politics has played a key role. The country is divided between northern and southern clans. In 2005 as a result of the Tulip revolution, Bakiyev, a representative of the southern clans, came to power as president. That did not entirely please the northern clans, a feeling that was made worse as he failed to keep his promises including to avoid assigning his own clan to governmental positions and avoid press censorship . He did the opposite.

Apparently, the northern clans gave him an ultimatum about three weeks ago to remove his brothers and son from their positions. In response, he had opposition leaders arrested which lit the fuse of the revolution in Talas which then spread across the country to Bishkek. It was in Talas that the head of the interior ministry was found shot as well.

So, now Bakiyev has escaped south and has no support in the more powerful north. Buh bye Bishkek.

Now both the US and China are assessing the change. The US from a military standpoint and China from security and balance of power issues. Russia is the clear winner whether or not it supported or had any hand whatsoever in the revolution and continues its progress to rein in the former Soviet republics. Orange, Rose and Tulip revolutions have all been rolled back and perception always trumps the truth.

What will the new regime bring? Probably little change, although one can hope. Omurbek Tekebaev and Temir Sariev, the two most visible opposition figures, are the same people who were in power under both Akayev and Bakiyev. Both were reelected to parliament in 2005 in a fraudulent election that sparked the Tulip Revolution. Both retained their seats under Bakiyev, and Tekebaev served briefly as speaker in Parliament. In the 10 years they have been in politics, nothing changed and indeed became worse. It is unlikely they can or will change anything now.

Georgia and Russia and Investigative Reports

Let's see...what is worse, stupidity or breaking international law? Would the second have occurred without the first or were they mutually exclusive and events would have progressed more or less toward the same conclusion.

In any event, I'm making a judgement call. The breach of international law identified in by those investigating the Russian-Georgian 5 day war is worse because it was a set-up (entrapment, if you wish) by the well armed prosecutor, Russia, taking advantage of the incredibly self-pitying and stupid Saakashvili in Georgia; the Russian's knew he would rise to the bait.

The investigative report was even handed; but, the breach of international law by Russia in, first, distributing citizenship papers and passports widely (as has been done in Crimea) and then seizing territory of the adjoining state during a civil war to "protect" it's "citizens" is only marginally better than Nazi Germany's actions in Czechoslovakia and Austria.

That being said, the inconceivable stupidity of Saakashvili in rising to the bait set out by Russia should disqualify him from running the country.

Victor Chernomyrdin Goes Home

The article in the Jamestown Foundation Blog regarding Victor Chernomyrdin's recall to Moscow from his long-held post of ambassador to Ukraine contains interesting background on his previous career which I never completely knew, particularly about the report to then V.P. Al Gore by the CIA. It is surprising that Gore dismissed the report given what was known about the state of business ethics in Russia at the time (and now, actually). I met Chernomyrdin at a reception at the US ambassador's home together with Al Gore when the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission was active. At the time I knew little about him and my connection with the Russian Federation was over a short time later as my job changed. What I do remember is that he was really, really short - or maybe that V.P. Gore was so tall. Whatever.

My next involvement with Chernomyrdin came at a small meeting in Kyiv among European ambassadors and Ukrainian officials discussing WTO and other economic issues in 2002.

At that meeting what struck me most was his amazingly dismissive and condescending attitude toward fairly important Ukrainian officials and Ukraine in general. This was pre-Orange Revolution of course, and he pointedly suggested that Ukraine simply allow Russia to lead the way and not try to attempt WTO or EU membership on its own. Of course, in 2008 WTO accession was granted to Ukraine. Russia is still not a member.

Victor Chernomyrdin's replacement will, I assume, be more diplomatic in his remarks and overall attitude.