Multiculturalism Fail

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German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared on Oct. 16 at a meeting of her party, the Christian Democratic Union, that multiculturalism, “has failed totally.” This is merely stating the obvious as the failure to integrate non-Germans into society was quite clear a very long time ago. The same can be said of France and all the other members of the old EU to one degree or another.


Horst Seehofer, minister-president of Bavaria and the chairman of a sister party to the Christian Democrats, said at the same meeting that the two parties were “committed to a dominant German culture and opposed to a multicultural one.” The reference to a dominant German culture is striking, for obvious reasons. However, the phenomenon is not confined to Germany as right wing populists gain in the polls, much as in the US. In this context, it is clear that immigration issues are affecting all of Europe and the response is not pleasant.

Of course, much of the reaction to immigration is driven by the deteriorating economies of Europe (although Germany is doing rather well despite a shortage of highly trained specialists). But, the perceived problem in Germany is of its own making.

Germany’s labor shortage began, again for obvious reasons, following World War II. So it began to import some skilled, but largely unskilled, labor from other European countries. These workers were referred to as “guest workers” and they came from Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey. They were considered temporary, as the name implies, not immigrants. Most returned as expected and in any event Germany had no plan for assimilation. Furthermore, Germans could now rely on the unskilled migrant workers to perform, well, unskilled and rudimentary jobs, thereby allowing Germans to move into far less menial positions.

Germany had a very liberal policy for the guest workers – including social benefits and the ability to bring in family members to join the already large number of migrants. Guess which migrants took advantage of this the most. Turks. And not Turks from the cosmopolitan west of Turkey or Istanbul, but from the very poor east. The Turkish community became permanent, raising families and, as the economy slumped, taking advantage of a very liberal German social safety net as they became un-employed.

Germany never wanted to assimilate any of the guest workers, but their own policies created a situation where they needed to do something. So they came up with the smoke and mirrors multi-culturalism solution. It seemed a great idea at the time, but contained a time bomb because the deal was that the guest workers (and at this point this really only included the Turkish population) could retain their cultural and social beliefs but had to pledge loyalty to Germany. This ended up creating a sub-class – a sort of separate but equal system – which did not share (and were not required to share) German values.

As I said earlier, this is not solely a German prediliction. Europeans in general have no idea how to assimilate different cultures. Germany, like France, hid its head in the sand and, until now, never defined what it meant to be German. There was never a core culture that the immigrants were required to accept in return for citizenship - a contract of shared values. Multi-culturalism is not dead because it never was alive in the first place. The German (and French) view was a pretence and merely created ghettos. Is it surprising that after being made second class persons that Turks in particular considered Turkey their home to which they owed loyalty?

For the Germans to claim failure now is a little like the shock – shock – that Greece lied about its finances in order to enter the Euro zone or that the unregulated, shadow banks in the US precipitated the latest economic crash.

But the current German view points to a broader issue. The fact that Germany is using the language of nationalism is, to put it mildly, a little alarming. Germany is looking beyond the old constraints that tied it to the Western defense and economic establishments, including the EU. Back to the future.

Germany already has the closest economic ties to Russia of any Western European state. Russia ties Germany to itself with energy and Germany provides investment to Russia. There is already the shadow of a political alliance. The Baltic States and Poland should view this developing relationship with alarm. So should the US.

The outcome the last time Germany talked up national interest was not at all agreeable.

Merkel, Barroso, Euro – Oh My

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Now it’s personal. Last week, as reported in the Guardian, German suggestions to reform the Euro-zone and re-open the Lisbon Treaty elicited a sharply worded response from José Manuel Barroso, the current head of the EC. Calling the German Chancellor “naïve” for suggesting that the Lisbon Treaty be re-opened was not designed to raise the level of the debate or improve her mood. The German response - that Barroso’s remarks were “absurd” - put the discussion in the basement.
Outside of Germany, I don’t think that many in the Euro-zone or the EU in general would support the German proposals for several reasons. First, re-opening the Treaty, which barely won approval in the first place, for the sole purpose of inserting provisions to penalize member states for not following monetary policy, is far more absurd than Barroso’s opposition to the proposal. As Barroso’s pointedly reminded Merkel, the Euro was the brainchild of France and Germany. Both, incidentally, also breached the monetary policies that were established. For Germany now to push forward some sort of punishment mechanism strikes me as a species of economic and political hegemony that is particularly distasteful to most of the other member states. Furthermore, expelling a member for non-compliance would likely result in a permanent, volutary withdrawal for the targeted country. A similar result would likely occur if voting rights were withdrawn. The European idea would be dead.
Second, and related to the first, is that Merkel is making a blatant attempt to control and mold the EU in Germany's image. In other words, nationalism is driving the German proposals. Again. Merkel is treading on dangerous ground and she has only herself to blame. It is abundantly clear that her anti-Greek rhetoric not only inflamed German public opinion but also significantly delayed EU action to develop a rescue plan for Greece. German political actions were directed at assigning blame first rather than fixing the problem and designed to increase German control of the EU. This is what the original economic union was designed to avoid - the nationalism that brought Europe to its knees. Eastern and Southern Europe will not swallow that particular pill. The UK would have the perfectly justified reason for never considering closer ties with an EU run from Berlin.

Merkel has now lost her ruling coalition in parliament. She has managed to inflame German public opinion not only against Greece, but Greeks, implying an inferiority of all southern tier member states. They have done it to the Turks. Now the Greeks, and by implication, Spain and Portugal. That is a dangerous road for Germans to follow under any circumstance and German perseverance in that regard will drive the southern tier and the Eastern European members to look elsewhere for political and economic support out of their self-inflicted economic trap.

European Dis-Union

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What is happening with the European Union? For some time, it has been abundantly clear that the core countries of the EU, Germany and France, were intent on controlling the organization both politically and economically. Germany, the economic power in Europe, has clearly tried, more or less successfully, in bending the union to its needs and desires. France is a distant second on the team but still retains a certain amount of leverage over the direction of EU policy. The Greek financial crises revealed the key fissure affecting both concept and practice – self-interest. Germany became the indispensable player. In doing so, Brussels has been sidelined for major issues. Perhaps permanently.

The EU, founded in part to undermine the foundations of nationalism that had inflicted two major wars in the 20th century, is now closing the circle. As a unified economic union it has worked rather well – until now. The protection of NATO, led by the United States, provided the necessary cover to allow economic reforms resulting in unprecedented prosperity and wealth within the union which did not need to fund military expenditures. Once the Soviet Union crashed and burned, the EU could rapidly expand to bring former satellites of the Kremlin inside the club. Again, the existential threat to Europe having vanished overnight, allowed it to concentrate on rapid economic growth, presumably as a bloc, without concerning itself with military expenditures. Expansion was rapid, but then hints of political issues, based on national interests, began to rise to the surface.

The first clear sign of cracks in the unified system were political. The proposed constitution, a mammoth, 400 page tome, was seen by Eastern Europe – particularly Poland, as changing the rules of the game mid-stream. Ireland was the first to vote it down. Although eventually enacted, this document was not a constitution. It was another treaty. In other words, the constitution was a contractual relationship among individual nations. Contracts can be broken, but more importantly was the underlying glossed-over issue of nationalism that the European Union was established to abolish.

Then came Iraq. The key players in the EU, Germany and France, are also key members of NATO. They split, sharply, with the Bush administration over Iraq and the imperial attitude of that administration which flaunted a “with us or against us” childishness in foreign policy that made opposition to the war very, very easy. In no small part, Eastern Europe, and particularly Poland, supported US foreign policy because they needed a balance to the Franco-German alliance within the EU which was threatening to develop a robust relationship with the Russian Federation. European Union cohesion began to unravel at a faster pace.

Nationalism has now risen from the dead. France and Germany, both vying for a leadership position in Europe, appear to have subordinated the goal of the union to purely national interests. Germany under Merkel has increased its dependence on Russian energy supplies to an extent that makes it difficult to criticize, much less resist the more aggressive tendencies of Moscow. This is of particular concern to Poland and the Baltic States – EU members - given their prior experience of deal-making between Russia and Germany.
France has not mirrored the nationalism of Germany, but it also is clearly acting in its own interests when it announced the sale of one or more Mistral class ships to Russia – the first such sale of reasonably advanced military hardware by a NATO member to the Russian Federation. The sale – which has yet to be finalized – did not go down well in the Baltics, or in Georgia.

The Russo-German love affair has alarmed the Eastern European member states enough to send their governments into the bomb shelters of national interest as opposed to those of the EU. If the precedence of national over European goals is good enough for Germany and France, it is just as appropriate for Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania.

Greece tripped the nationalism wire completely. Andrea Merkel fomented an anti-Greek atmosphere in Germany for purely political, national reasons that made any sort of unified assistance by the other member states much more difficult. Germany, she clearly implied, would call the shots on any rescue plan. The Greeks were lazy, as compared to good, hardworking Germans, and could not be trusted. Her fulminations resulted in an electorate that not only does not care about Greece, but dislikes it. Now, when forced to lead the bailout, Merkel must backtrack – which resulted in the loss of an important bi-election and damaging her party’s ability to run the country alone. Hoisted on her own petard. And she is not alone in Europe.

Leaving aside the fact that the financial collapse of Greece was entirely self-inflicted, Merkel casually ignored the detail that German representatives occupy some lofty posts in the financial regulatory councils of Brussels who somehow missed the evidence of the approaching melt-down. Germany was going to run the show now for the good of Germany. The attitude was noted in Warsaw, Madrid, Rome and Ankara. The latter, though not a member largely because of the prejudices of the French, Germans and, as always the Austrians, has been given a taste of how it will be treated if the opposition to Turkish membership is ever overcome.

What has happened with the financial crises in the euro-zone is that Germany has essentially changed the deal - one member’s problems are not those of the EU. The union was established as an economic zone, and not a United States of Europe. Gradually, the idea of being a citizen of Europe took over. Without a deep crises, this political concept worked well despite the fact that it was never intended to politically integrate each member nation. With the financial crises in general and the Greek collapse and bailout in particular, the unity of the EU has been shattered despite the rescue plan. The entire episode firmly establishes the lack of a unified foreign policy within the EU. This inability to formulate a consensus approach in foreign affairs is not new. It has merely been below the event horizon for most of the last 50 years. Not any more. The interests of Germany, France, Poland and the southern tier of states are not congruent and in many cases are in direct opposition to each other.

From a foreign policy standpoint, the charade of a unified European approach as a balance to the US, however admirable, has vaporized. The election in the UK resulted in a coalition government, however long it lasts, that is led by a strong Euroskeptic crowd which the LibDems will not be able to overcome. Brussels will find it hard to maintain the appearance of unity, much less a unified foreign policy approach, in a firmly nationalistic Europe.

Turkey Rising?

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The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, has been quite busy of in the past month, meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan, the EU, Brazil, Serbia, Bosnia and NATO ministers, and has met with some success in getting what Turkey feels is in its interests. 

For example, after what by all accounts was a difficult dinner in Tallinn, Davutoğlu managed to win over enough NATO members, to get NATO MAP (Membership Action Plan) status for Bosnia.  Although this is part of Turkey's well know efforts to achieve reconciliation in the Balkans, an old stomping ground, it also shows that despite the brush-off and broken promises from certain EU members regarding accession, Turkey is in Europe.

As part of Turkey's Balkan reconciliation effort, Davutoğlu also met with the foreign ministers of Serbia and Spain.  Serbia, of course, is not happy about Bosnia's proposed NATO membership.  However,  Davutoğlu's meetings with Spain and Serbia are also meant to advance Serbia's integration efforts into the EU and NATO. As if that was not enough, a future meeting in Istanbul will involve a presidential summit among Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia.


Perhaps the EU needs to take another look at its tactics regarding Turkish membership and Turkey in general - because Turkey is a European power now whether they like it or not.

The riskiest venture though is Turkey's attempts, with Brazil, to negotiate some sort of fuel swap deal with Tehran.

Last week Davutoğlu met with Catherine Ashton, the EU Foreign Minister, to review his earlier talks in Tehran regarding the fuel swap negotiations. Brazil's Foreign Minister is flying to Tehran soon to continue the pursuit of a deal.  So, what happens if Turkey and Brazil do come up with a deal?  I'm very skeptical that the deal can be brokered given the current rhetoric flowing out ofTehran.  However, assuming that the talks succeed, then then sanctions would be off the table at the UN where they are scheduled to be raised in June when France chairs the Security Council. A deal would be embarrassing for the US and Tehran.  The US has been pushing hard for sanctions and Tehran has been its usual strutting self.  At the end of the day, the US can get over the embarrassment because a solution would be a vindication of its Iran policy.  Tehran not so much. Which is why I am not convinced the negotiations have any chance of success.

The fact is, Turkey and Iran are not strategic partners and both have geo-political aims for dominance in the Middle East.  Iran has a military budget the size of Finland's and is an economic mess. Turkey is a major military and economic power that just happens to anchor NATO in the east. For Tehran to agree to a fuel swap would deliver a huge diplomatic plum to Turkey, enhance its prestige and allow it to reach deep into a region in which Iran would like to compete and control.  The deal won't happen without some intense bargaining.

There is a downside risk for Turkey in its attempt to work with Iran.  Failure to broker this deal will tarnish Turkey's image as a regional leader.  It has been unable to arrive at a successful solution among Israel, Syria and the Palestinians and is already seen in the West as being just a little too supportive of Iranian ambitions. Failure to move Iran to accept a fuel swap deal acceptable to the West will put Ankara in an awkward position when sanctions come to a vote in the UN in two months time where it will likely abstain.

The Falklands - Issues in International Law

The growing tension in the South Atlantic over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands between the UK and Argentina are unlikely to lead to a second Falklands war for many reasons, not the least of which is that Argentina could not successfully deploy its now depleted forces to the islands without significant bloodshed. Stationed on and around the Falklands are about 1,000 British troops, four fighter/bomber aircraft, a frigate and a local population that is unlikely to be surprised a second time. For all practical purposes a military confrontation is not going to happen. Argentina is indulging in diplomatic tactics coupled with questionable international legal claims that will not change the status of the islands nor stop the current oil drilling. If oil is discovered in the volumes suspected, it would not be surprising to discover revenue sharing as part of the settlement.

From a legal standpoint, Argentina is also on thin ice.

The Guardian reports that the Argentine government has issued a decree which will require all ships bound for the islands or travelling through waters claimed (emphasis mine) by Argentina to secure a permit. The clear purpose is to prevent ships carrying oil exploration equipment from Argentina to the Islands. The Telegraph reports as well that the Argentine authorities have already prevented a ship, the Thor Leader, from leaving port carrying pipeline equipment which it was suspected was destined for the Islands. A claim of territorial waters is not equivalent to a legal right. The dispute raises a number of international law issues.

Under international law, Argentina can limit access by ships to and from its ports provided it has not entered into any treaty obligations which would require it to allow unconditional access to its ports. To my knowledge, there is no provision for unconditional access. However, Argentina has extended its rights to ships passing through its territorial waters of Argentina. Regardless of the extent of territorial waters, Article 17 of the Law of the Sea Convention provides that ships have a right of innocent passage, as defined, thereby making the enforcement of the Argentinian act legally problematic, even if one accepted its territorial water claims.

Argentina has not been successful in establishing its claim to the Falklands in law or in fact. The last attempt in the latter choice ended in military disaster and collapse of the government. It is in the process of drumming up support in South and Central America for its claims, but this is really only smoke and mirrors and costs the supporting countries nothing. However, from a political standpoint, the political position of sovereignty is double edged. Venezuela, for example, in an attempt to be relevant or simply annoying, recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia - both legally recognized as part of Georgia. The same argument could theoretically be applied to the Falkland Islands - not a trend, I suspect, that Argentina or its supporters would like to see continued. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, this position is not only weak but very dangerous. Furthermore, the UN Charter contains broad language supporting the right of self-determination which makes the legal claim over the islands - virtually totally populated by British subjects - unsupportable.

Argentina announced that it will take the dispute that has arisen because of oil to the UN. Assuming that Argentina will not raise the issue of sovereignty and only addresses the sea bed issue, it would still be necessary for their representative to set forth the legal reasons why Argentina's jurisdiction applies under the appropriate provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention.

The Law of the Sea Convention applies only to the sea bed outside of territorial limits. Therefore, the position of both the UK and Argentina claiming 200 nautical miles would need to be decided first. The Convention sets forth a detailed definition of continental shelves which may extend the area subject to national control. This limit is, at a maximum, 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea. The baseline is further defined to include consideration of the extent of the continental shelf and can be up to 350 nautical miles. It is unlikely that either claim of more than 200 nautical miles, which would otherwise be subject to additional rules should they overlap, is legally supportable. However, Argentina claims sovereignty over the islands on, at least, the extension of its continental shelf as well as the 350 nautical mile limit.

Any dispute under the Convention must be brought to the Commission on the Limits to the Continental Shelf, which, in fact, Argentina has done. That case has not been decided in favour of Argentina as an answer to its claims were filed by the UK in August 2009. Further, a position claiming 350 nautical miles would necessarily bring up the issue of sovereignty of the islands - something that won't be touched by the ICJ or the Commission.

In any case, Argentina, if it chooses to push the matter forward to conclusion, will ultimately need to litigate this matter in the ICJ - a very long process.

Legally, its position regarding the issue of drilling in what Argentina claims as territorial waters will not be easily resolved. Which is why a diplomatic and economic solution will likely be the route both nations will follow.

Tough Times in the Baltics

Latvia is approaching an economic meltdown that could bring people out on the streets and the IMF is not helping the situation with its demands that collide with what the EU wants, and has received.

Latvia is not alone in Europe to feel the effects of the global recession, but it's recent failed bond sale back in June was, to say the least, eyebrow raising. All of Europe has struggled with stimulation plans that simultaneously increase budget deficits. For example, public debt in the UK was 52% of the GDP in 2008. Now,it is over 68%. Similar problems have appeared in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Spain and Estonia, to name a few.

Street demonstrations have became violent in Latvia at the beginning of 2009. As countries seek budget cuts to deal with deficits, demonstrations have increased in France and Greece.

Latvia's bond sale failure raised an issue with its monetary peg to the Euro (a requirement) prompting a demand by the EC to cut its deficit, which it did by dropping 10% from its pension funding. The EC then provided loan funds to help stabilize the economy. This is a tough decision, as cuts in social programs can easily translate into street riots. But, the EC required that 50% of the tranche be spent on shoring up the banking system.

Enter the IMF. They don't care as much about the banking system. So, their demand is a further cut in social programs - particularly in the pension system. This is asking for trouble and continues the history of the IMF demanding budgetary reforms which it knows, or should know, will result in social unrest. In the Baltics, of course, this plays into the hands of Russia which is happy to provide loans for political and not economic reasons.

The IMF is requiring changes that the EC does not. It is knowingly requiring budget cuts that will result in social unrest. During a global recession, this is certifiably stupid and I don't blame the Latvian Prime Minister Dombrovskis for saying "no".

Nabucco

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The Nabucco pipeline agreement has been signed. This pipeline is designed to pump gas from Central Asia to Europe without transiting Russia. That's good news for Europe. The bad news is that there is no gas yet to fill it, is far from complete and would need support from Iran and Armenia.

Still, it is a good start and should start to focus Russia's attention on its inappropriate use of energy as a foreign policy weapon against Europe.

Russia and the WTO

Russia has pursued a policy of creating an alternate universe, politically and economically, in a strangely confrontational manner. The recent withdrawal from WTO talks, coupled with the veto of the OSCE mission in the Caucuses confirms that it has no fundamental intention of cooperating with any organization or country that it considers a threat to its goal of reasserting its hold on what used to be termed its "near abroad".

This may be a mistake of huge proportions in the long term. It faces competition from China in Central Asia and in Europe, Putin's aggressive stance has been only successful in the short-term. The EU is now painfully aware that it's dependence on Russian energy is a serious problem since Russia is very willing to use it as a weapon to achieve its foreign policy goals. But, Nabucco will now go forward, China has just concluded a huge deal for gas with Turkmenistan and although Norway's recent discovery of a potentially huge reserve of natural gas will not come on-line for years, the short-term gains achieved so far by Moscow will be remembered in the long-term.

The recognition by Russia of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, accompanied by Lavrov's assertion that the world needs to accept "new realities", has focused the attention of the Baltic States and Poland (perhaps even Belarus) that Russian foreign policy as applied to its neighbors is not benign.

Withdrawal from WTO negotiations seems particularly gratuitous since membership has been a goal of Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To tell the world that Moscow is the center of a new, multi-polar world in which the Russian Federation can do anything it wants within its sphere of influence will backfire. It's economy is not strong and would benefit by WTO membership, which might force it to broaden its economy beyond energy. It is surrounded by political and economic competitors who do belong to the WTO and are not inclined to accept Russian leadership.

Russian positioning is not earning it any friends, much less partners. Putin - and he is fooling no one - is in charge. Medvedev is a messenger. The message to Russia's neighbors is to tow the line or suffer the consequences - mostly economic, but with the threat of military intervention. Coupled with the death of anything that could remotely be defined as "democratic" makes the region, ultimately, less stable.

Victor Chernomyrdin Goes Home

The article in the Jamestown Foundation Blog regarding Victor Chernomyrdin's recall to Moscow from his long-held post of ambassador to Ukraine contains interesting background on his previous career which I never completely knew, particularly about the report to then V.P. Al Gore by the CIA. It is surprising that Gore dismissed the report given what was known about the state of business ethics in Russia at the time (and now, actually). I met Chernomyrdin at a reception at the US ambassador's home together with Al Gore when the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission was active. At the time I knew little about him and my connection with the Russian Federation was over a short time later as my job changed. What I do remember is that he was really, really short - or maybe that V.P. Gore was so tall. Whatever.

My next involvement with Chernomyrdin came at a small meeting in Kyiv among European ambassadors and Ukrainian officials discussing WTO and other economic issues in 2002.

At that meeting what struck me most was his amazingly dismissive and condescending attitude toward fairly important Ukrainian officials and Ukraine in general. This was pre-Orange Revolution of course, and he pointedly suggested that Ukraine simply allow Russia to lead the way and not try to attempt WTO or EU membership on its own. Of course, in 2008 WTO accession was granted to Ukraine. Russia is still not a member.

Victor Chernomyrdin's replacement will, I assume, be more diplomatic in his remarks and overall attitude.