Multiculturalism Fail

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German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared on Oct. 16 at a meeting of her party, the Christian Democratic Union, that multiculturalism, “has failed totally.” This is merely stating the obvious as the failure to integrate non-Germans into society was quite clear a very long time ago. The same can be said of France and all the other members of the old EU to one degree or another.


Horst Seehofer, minister-president of Bavaria and the chairman of a sister party to the Christian Democrats, said at the same meeting that the two parties were “committed to a dominant German culture and opposed to a multicultural one.” The reference to a dominant German culture is striking, for obvious reasons. However, the phenomenon is not confined to Germany as right wing populists gain in the polls, much as in the US. In this context, it is clear that immigration issues are affecting all of Europe and the response is not pleasant.

Of course, much of the reaction to immigration is driven by the deteriorating economies of Europe (although Germany is doing rather well despite a shortage of highly trained specialists). But, the perceived problem in Germany is of its own making.

Germany’s labor shortage began, again for obvious reasons, following World War II. So it began to import some skilled, but largely unskilled, labor from other European countries. These workers were referred to as “guest workers” and they came from Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey. They were considered temporary, as the name implies, not immigrants. Most returned as expected and in any event Germany had no plan for assimilation. Furthermore, Germans could now rely on the unskilled migrant workers to perform, well, unskilled and rudimentary jobs, thereby allowing Germans to move into far less menial positions.

Germany had a very liberal policy for the guest workers – including social benefits and the ability to bring in family members to join the already large number of migrants. Guess which migrants took advantage of this the most. Turks. And not Turks from the cosmopolitan west of Turkey or Istanbul, but from the very poor east. The Turkish community became permanent, raising families and, as the economy slumped, taking advantage of a very liberal German social safety net as they became un-employed.

Germany never wanted to assimilate any of the guest workers, but their own policies created a situation where they needed to do something. So they came up with the smoke and mirrors multi-culturalism solution. It seemed a great idea at the time, but contained a time bomb because the deal was that the guest workers (and at this point this really only included the Turkish population) could retain their cultural and social beliefs but had to pledge loyalty to Germany. This ended up creating a sub-class – a sort of separate but equal system – which did not share (and were not required to share) German values.

As I said earlier, this is not solely a German prediliction. Europeans in general have no idea how to assimilate different cultures. Germany, like France, hid its head in the sand and, until now, never defined what it meant to be German. There was never a core culture that the immigrants were required to accept in return for citizenship - a contract of shared values. Multi-culturalism is not dead because it never was alive in the first place. The German (and French) view was a pretence and merely created ghettos. Is it surprising that after being made second class persons that Turks in particular considered Turkey their home to which they owed loyalty?

For the Germans to claim failure now is a little like the shock – shock – that Greece lied about its finances in order to enter the Euro zone or that the unregulated, shadow banks in the US precipitated the latest economic crash.

But the current German view points to a broader issue. The fact that Germany is using the language of nationalism is, to put it mildly, a little alarming. Germany is looking beyond the old constraints that tied it to the Western defense and economic establishments, including the EU. Back to the future.

Germany already has the closest economic ties to Russia of any Western European state. Russia ties Germany to itself with energy and Germany provides investment to Russia. There is already the shadow of a political alliance. The Baltic States and Poland should view this developing relationship with alarm. So should the US.

The outcome the last time Germany talked up national interest was not at all agreeable.

European Dis-Union

Image by Henrique Oscar Loeffler via Flickr

What is happening with the European Union? For some time, it has been abundantly clear that the core countries of the EU, Germany and France, were intent on controlling the organization both politically and economically. Germany, the economic power in Europe, has clearly tried, more or less successfully, in bending the union to its needs and desires. France is a distant second on the team but still retains a certain amount of leverage over the direction of EU policy. The Greek financial crises revealed the key fissure affecting both concept and practice – self-interest. Germany became the indispensable player. In doing so, Brussels has been sidelined for major issues. Perhaps permanently.

The EU, founded in part to undermine the foundations of nationalism that had inflicted two major wars in the 20th century, is now closing the circle. As a unified economic union it has worked rather well – until now. The protection of NATO, led by the United States, provided the necessary cover to allow economic reforms resulting in unprecedented prosperity and wealth within the union which did not need to fund military expenditures. Once the Soviet Union crashed and burned, the EU could rapidly expand to bring former satellites of the Kremlin inside the club. Again, the existential threat to Europe having vanished overnight, allowed it to concentrate on rapid economic growth, presumably as a bloc, without concerning itself with military expenditures. Expansion was rapid, but then hints of political issues, based on national interests, began to rise to the surface.

The first clear sign of cracks in the unified system were political. The proposed constitution, a mammoth, 400 page tome, was seen by Eastern Europe – particularly Poland, as changing the rules of the game mid-stream. Ireland was the first to vote it down. Although eventually enacted, this document was not a constitution. It was another treaty. In other words, the constitution was a contractual relationship among individual nations. Contracts can be broken, but more importantly was the underlying glossed-over issue of nationalism that the European Union was established to abolish.

Then came Iraq. The key players in the EU, Germany and France, are also key members of NATO. They split, sharply, with the Bush administration over Iraq and the imperial attitude of that administration which flaunted a “with us or against us” childishness in foreign policy that made opposition to the war very, very easy. In no small part, Eastern Europe, and particularly Poland, supported US foreign policy because they needed a balance to the Franco-German alliance within the EU which was threatening to develop a robust relationship with the Russian Federation. European Union cohesion began to unravel at a faster pace.

Nationalism has now risen from the dead. France and Germany, both vying for a leadership position in Europe, appear to have subordinated the goal of the union to purely national interests. Germany under Merkel has increased its dependence on Russian energy supplies to an extent that makes it difficult to criticize, much less resist the more aggressive tendencies of Moscow. This is of particular concern to Poland and the Baltic States – EU members - given their prior experience of deal-making between Russia and Germany.
France has not mirrored the nationalism of Germany, but it also is clearly acting in its own interests when it announced the sale of one or more Mistral class ships to Russia – the first such sale of reasonably advanced military hardware by a NATO member to the Russian Federation. The sale – which has yet to be finalized – did not go down well in the Baltics, or in Georgia.

The Russo-German love affair has alarmed the Eastern European member states enough to send their governments into the bomb shelters of national interest as opposed to those of the EU. If the precedence of national over European goals is good enough for Germany and France, it is just as appropriate for Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania.

Greece tripped the nationalism wire completely. Andrea Merkel fomented an anti-Greek atmosphere in Germany for purely political, national reasons that made any sort of unified assistance by the other member states much more difficult. Germany, she clearly implied, would call the shots on any rescue plan. The Greeks were lazy, as compared to good, hardworking Germans, and could not be trusted. Her fulminations resulted in an electorate that not only does not care about Greece, but dislikes it. Now, when forced to lead the bailout, Merkel must backtrack – which resulted in the loss of an important bi-election and damaging her party’s ability to run the country alone. Hoisted on her own petard. And she is not alone in Europe.

Leaving aside the fact that the financial collapse of Greece was entirely self-inflicted, Merkel casually ignored the detail that German representatives occupy some lofty posts in the financial regulatory councils of Brussels who somehow missed the evidence of the approaching melt-down. Germany was going to run the show now for the good of Germany. The attitude was noted in Warsaw, Madrid, Rome and Ankara. The latter, though not a member largely because of the prejudices of the French, Germans and, as always the Austrians, has been given a taste of how it will be treated if the opposition to Turkish membership is ever overcome.

What has happened with the financial crises in the euro-zone is that Germany has essentially changed the deal - one member’s problems are not those of the EU. The union was established as an economic zone, and not a United States of Europe. Gradually, the idea of being a citizen of Europe took over. Without a deep crises, this political concept worked well despite the fact that it was never intended to politically integrate each member nation. With the financial crises in general and the Greek collapse and bailout in particular, the unity of the EU has been shattered despite the rescue plan. The entire episode firmly establishes the lack of a unified foreign policy within the EU. This inability to formulate a consensus approach in foreign affairs is not new. It has merely been below the event horizon for most of the last 50 years. Not any more. The interests of Germany, France, Poland and the southern tier of states are not congruent and in many cases are in direct opposition to each other.

From a foreign policy standpoint, the charade of a unified European approach as a balance to the US, however admirable, has vaporized. The election in the UK resulted in a coalition government, however long it lasts, that is led by a strong Euroskeptic crowd which the LibDems will not be able to overcome. Brussels will find it hard to maintain the appearance of unity, much less a unified foreign policy approach, in a firmly nationalistic Europe.

Albania and the EU

I'm shocked....shocked

So, a small Moslem country is ok. A large one, well......

Meeting in Moscow

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The meetings being held as I write in Moscow will decide how the US and Russia will deal with each other for rest of 2009 and perhaps beyond. The US wants Russia's help with Afghanistan, Iran and Palestine. Russia wants the US to draw back from Eastern Europe, Georgia and Central Asia. Both Russia and the US want to sign a successor treaty to START.

Russia has stated that the US can transport non-lethal and lethal materials over and perhaps on its territory for the Afghan effort. This will not come without a quid pro quo. The question is - what will the US give up? The BMD's in Poland will likely be postponed. The US will also likely agree to draw back a little on efforts to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. In the former, there is simply no strong desire and in the latter, the current government behaves too eratically to be considered an ally.

The BMD placement is really not a big deal since they are of questionable utility and Poland has just received significant military hardware from the US (50 F16) and will soon deploy Patriot missles as well. This will allow Poland to feel a little more secure and will satisfy Poland to the extent that it needs to at the moment. What else can the US give up? Very little, I would imagine, without damaging its credibility in Eastern Europe.

Ultimately, aside from a reduction in nuclear arsenals which both countries want, the geopolitical differences are not that flexible. I don't expect much to come out of the meeting other than a new START treaty, postponement of the BMDs and a temporary lull in the expansion of NATO.