New, Old World Order

I am, finally, returning to a thesis not widely supported but which I believe is rapidly taking shape: the world has returned to a pre-1939 political structure where regional powers are making more foreign policy decisions based on national interests rather than within alliances. Blocs like NATO, ASEAN and even Shanghai Cooperation Organization are have become largely clubs without transnational impact, except at times militarily like NATO, and even then are severely constrained by the conflicting international interests of their members.  This is also true of the European Union where the political (and perhaps fiscal) unraveling of the Eurozone is proceeding apace.

Some caveats.  First, this is not about the perceived decline of the United States because it is not a decline except in relative terms.  It is about the reality of multi-polarity and local dominance and not absolute decline and fall – something a vast number of Europeans and Americans simply are too reluctant or obtuse to understand. The United States is still the leading military power on a planet-wide basis in general.  Its navy with accompanying air power can go anywhere, anytime and push anyone out of the way. No one can project military power like the US and no one is going to be able to do so for a very long time. In the wrong hands, as we have seen, that has been a problem.  But, there is simply no competition.

Nevertheless, on land and in foreign affairs, it is a different matter. The ill-conceived war in Iraq and the seemingly endless war in Afghanistan have drained the power of the United States militarily, economically and politically.  The policies of the neo-cons and the far right in the US have destroyed the “city on the hill” image that Ronald Reagan tried to push both domestically and internationally. The eight year Bush administration buried the credibility, economy and good will felt toward the US with its astonishingly arrogant, incompetent (but unsurprising) foreign policy otherwise known as the ‘go-it-alone’, ‘with us or against us’ and ‘international agreements be damned’ posturing. 

Second, the European Union remains a creation with enormous potential; but the failure to push for more political integration is now fraying the edges of its economic foundation.  If it is able to resolve the fiscal issues of its member states fairly, then the opportunity to conduct a unified foreign policy will have a chance.  It is not, in my opinion, likely.  Which is why the EU is not included in my list as an entity – just a few member states.

Third, a seismic event could reverse the trend toward the nation-centric foreign policy of pre-1939. I believe in the improbable and dismiss facile bell curves, models and forecasts based on hindsight. It’s what you have dismissed as improbable that will hurt you – usually badly.  The fiscal crises which began in 2008 could have been such an event and should not have been unforeseen, but that moment has dissipated with the uneven recovery – some countries doing much better than others such as in the case of Germany which unfortunately, also proceeded to vocally relegate some member states –the southern tier and Greece in particular - to second citizen status with some distasteful,  nationalistic  remarks bordering on bigotry.   

So, on a region by region basis I believe we are looking at an old, new world order.  It may last a decade or fifty years.  My bet is that it will last longer than anyone expects.  Its structure is that of the realpolitik world of pre-1939 which largely came crashing to a bloody end in 1945 with the rise of the blocs. Some blocs are still around but in reality began a rapid disintegration with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Viewing the political map from this geo-political perspective, there are several clear, locally powerful players – China and India; Russia; Turkey; Germany and France; the Visegrad group; and, of course, the US.  Oh – and BRIC is not a bloc – it is a label of convenience mostly for economists who, like Linus and his blanket, need to pigeon-hole un-related countries into nice chewable morsels. 

I have not included Iran because, compared to the others and despite the hysterics of the galactically stupid right wing in the US, it simply doesn’t count.  Its economy is in shambles and it is politically unstable and cannot risk going to war or cutting off the Strait of Hormuz because that would invite retaliation of the most unpleasant sort by almost everyone.  It’s not near to building a single nuclear bomb and couldn’t afford to toss it in any direction even it did manage that amazingly difficult task because then it would be wiped out.

I did not include any African country because, well, if you can name one that is a regional power with enough influence both economically and militarily to do anything with significant impact except very locally, you win a cookie.  South Africa is the sub-Sahara elephant in the room– but its absurd attempts to play on the world stage as it has in Libya make it more of an annoying busybody than effective player.  The African Union in general is an old boys’ club intent on maintaining the status quo. Just look at the lack of effective condemnation of Mugabe’s reign by the AU. 

I also do not include any South American country despite my strong temptation to present Brazil as a player.  Maybe soon, but not now.

That’s my pre-amble.  Next time, and as a first choice, let’s look at Turkey or, more to the point, how Turkey looks at everyone else and their reaction.

India, Pakistan and Afghanistan - Obama in India

President Obama is in India. Pakistan is miffed. India considers an Afghanistan empty of US troops as a threat since it will revert to a land mass controlled from Islamabad through Pakistan’s security apparatus working with acceptable elements of the Taliban. Pakistan’s western border would then be reasonably secure allowing it to turn its attention to India and the Kashmir issue.
India is, to say the least, touchy about foreign intervention attempts at settling the Kashmir “problem”. As far as India is concerned, Kashmir is an internal security matter. As NATO and US presence begins to evaporate in Afghanistan, India has been inserting itself with development aid and establishing a foothold to maintain its leverage against Pakistan and prevent it from turning its attention to the east.
However, what possible alternatives are there to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a center of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist training if it is not a strong Pakistani presence? Islamabad is very familiar with the players and would not be inclined to accept the former Taliban regime from regaining anything close to its former level of power. They would likely support enough Taliban control to stabilize Afghanistan through traditional tribal deals and to create a status quo that resembles the Afghanistan of pre-Soviet times. This is what India will try to disrupt.
Is there a deal that can be brokered between India and Pakistan and can Obama do it. Frankly, I doubt it merely because Pakistan wants a settlement of the Kashmir issue, India does not except solely on its terms and the US has little leverage. Pakistan may want continued US support, but that won’t happen at the expense of India if only because of the economic element – Pakistan has little to offer while India controls a huge market that impacts US jobs and trade. There is also a little matter of balancing China’s growing influence.

Nevertheless, it is US foreign policy that can play the largest role in the sub-continent – no one even comes close. Obama visits Pakistan next year and will have a chance to smooth over the ruffled feathers in Islamabad. Afghanistan will be in full wind down. No one can afford a vacuum. The transfer of power to multiple parties in Afghanistan, including Karzai, the mayor of Kabul, needs to be arranged with security and stability in mind.
Unlike Iraq, where the US invasion and handling of the aftermath has resulted in the destruction of secularity and a gift of the entire country to Iran, the transition process in Afghanistan must carefully balance regional interests so that no one country ends up on top.

The Upcoming Surprise War

Image via Wikipedia

It will be a surprise in the West, at least.  Get ready for a vicious little war in Sudan that will spill over into Uganda and Ethiopia. And it will be about oil.

Come January, the independence referendum in southern Sudan will either have been approved resoundingly or Khartoum will delay the vote.  Both will result in war and if anyone thinks that Darfur is bad - well, you ain't seen nothin' yet.

The proposed border is vague, to say the least. The oil resources straddle the border. Northern Sudan has been at war in the south for three decades. Over 1 million people have died. Both the north and south depend on the oil revenues while China and India depend on the oil. The rest of the planet is distracted - there will be no US or EU intervention.  The African Union is weak and broke.

The factors coming together - oil, religion, geography and no prospect of outside intervention - are deadly.  The importance of avoiding a major conflict cannot be overstated.  If Uganda and Ethiopia become destabilized the prospects of penetration by trans-national Islamic militants is huge and their own internal problems will be made worse.  Loss of oil production will force China and India to look elsewhere - and prices will go up.

Three months and counting.

Who Lost India? Courtesy of Robert Kaplan

Image by amanky via Flickr

Robert Kaplan has been around for some time now and could be characterized as a "reasonable" neo-con. He supported, indeed promoted, the invasion of Iraq before he opposed the war.  He is all for intervention by the US against leaders like Saddam Hussein. Still.  Because he travelled to these oppressed countries and saw for himself the suffering of the population.  Now, in this paper he explains why, if the US deserts Afghanistan it is deserting India and because of the geography of the sub-continent and its history, India will be driven into the arms of China.

Although Kaplan does not explicitly state that the US should remain in Afghanistan, its pretty much there in the background.  He says that the US should not spend enormous amounts of money in Afghanistan specifically to impress India, but it must be part of the considerations regarding the Afghan strategy.

I find this whole line of reasoning to be somewhat STRATFOR-ESQ (one of the leading foreign policy analyst publications with a geo-political bent).  This is not a zero sum game among China the US and India. India is concerned about a Taliban takeover after the US leaves next summer. But so does Russia and China.  Pakistan might benefit as their security apparatus uses the Taliban to its own ends - but that particular relationship is pretty much soured - and provide them with a secure rear when facing India.  But that's not the point. India was not leaning toward China before the Afghan war despite Taliban control. It is unlikely to jump into the arms of the Chinese - a major competitor both economically and politically - after the US withdraws.

Therefore, Kaplan is just throwing up his straw-man of the "who lost India" genre in order to forestall the end day of US involvement with Kabul on a military basis.

Afghanistan Surge

The Obama plan is not what I would have hoped for since other than the July 2011 date to begin withdrawal there is no exit strategy. Perhaps there is one, but the strategy was not announced. To my mind, this was a necessary step in explaining the entire plan to the public. Now, however, and despite statements to the contrary, the withdrawal must really begin in the summer of 2011.

General McChrystal largely got what he wanted. The media, as usual, reported that the approved 30,000 was short of the troop surge that he had requested. He has more. The media conveniently forgot the 21,000 sent earlier this year. So, the US has committed another 51,000 and not 30,000. So be it and I really hope the general is correct in his assessment because he has 18 months to prove it.

If the troop withdrawal does not start in July 2011 then the surge will convert to an occupation in the eyes of the Afghans, something I would hope the US had learned to avoid from its ongoing experience in Iraq. This would be a mistake of enormous proportions because it would be seen that the US is supporting a corrupt regime in the face of an indigenous Pashtun uprising with an army made up of minority Tajiks.

Furthermore, Obama has stated that this is not a war of choice, but of necessity. Maybe - but I still wonder who we are fighting. That the Taliban are a despicable throw-back to twelfth century beliefs does not make them the enemy. Distasteful, oppressive and dangerous internally to Afghans - particularly women - they may be. But, the US cannot wage war on those grounds everywhere. So is the Mugabe regime, not to mention the proposed legislation in Uganda calling for the death penalty for homosexuals (supported, by the way, by the US homegrown Taliban known as the far right christian fundamentalists and their Republican allies).

If the purpose of the surge is to protect areas long enough to solidify opposition to the Taliban, then who is going to do that after the withdrawal? The Afghan army is composed largely of Tajiks who will have serious trouble operating in Pashtun majority areas. Indeed, it has taken 8 years to train 100,000 Afghan troops. Is the plan to train an equal number in 18 months even remotely feasible?

Is the goal to destroy al Qaida? It wouldn't seem necessary to employ 55,000 troops to go after a shattered organization which has not mounted a serious attack in 5 years. In any case, destroying the terrorist organization should not be the goal in Afghanistan not merely because its total destruction is likely impossible, but because the goal should be to deny it a base. Again, that does not take 55,000 troops.

The US has indulged in nation building in Iraq and is dangerously close to that goal in Afghanistan. This is the worst mistake since it is not a nation and only can be dealt with - if that's the phrase - as a collection of tribes and clans. The US cannot afford to stay in Afghanistan to cobble together a unified nation and certainly not with Karzai, the mayor of Kabul.

My take on this strategy is that there are too many points where it can fail ranging from the perception of occupation by foreigners to a corrupt, ineffective government that has lost legitimacy but which will attempt to keep the US in the game well beyond the 2011 withdrawal phase.

Beyond the borders of Afghanistan, the US and the surge will produce additional tensions between India and Pakistan. The latter have no desire to see Afghan Taliban, supported by the Pakistan government, pushed into Pakistan only to be followed in hot pursuit by troops or an increase in drone attacks. Pakistan is also concerned by Indian influence in Afghanistan and, paranoid or not, feels that India is encircling it.

Then there is Iran which seems to be involved in a slow motion drain circling dance internally but which also appears to be deliberately provoking the West. With troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, a belligerent Israel and an independent minded Turkey, how does Obama deal with a sudden Iran crisis? More importantly, how does he deal with the massive unemployment in the US while funding these military interventions.

I hope McChrystal is right and the Obama strategy works - at least to a certain extent - so that the US can declare it has done what it can do for Afghanistan, eliminated a base for al Qaida to operate within to train and launch attacks, and then leave.

BRIC (bat)

So far, the media is treating the recent BRIC meeting in Moscow as a big event of rising powers - Brazil, Russia, India and China - joining together in a powerful new bloc.

It isn't.

The first communiqué consisted of the usual pablum of urging a greater role for developing nations in international institutions. Wow. Just Wow.

BRIC has been characterized as a potential balance against the US. How is that going to work exactly? Russia, I can understand wanting to regain its role vis a vis the US. China? They have no interest in irritating the US and neither does Brazil. India does not exactly trust China and Brazil is on the other side of the planet from everyone else.

On the BBC, an emphasis was placed on Russia's foreign currency reserves as a symbol of the potential of BRIC. Uh...well...with a budget deficit of 11 percent of GDP in April, a decline of 16.2 percent in revenues between April and May and a total deficit of $100 billion, its reserve fund is accounted for. Its Ministry of Finance recently announced that it would jump into the international bond market forexternal funding of its deficit. How's that working out so far?

BRIC will fade into the world of annual economic coordination meetings accomplishing little, if anything.