Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Death of bin Laden

If you’ve noticed a dearth of postings it’s because I’m busy with my day job. I’ll be posting more often once the frenetic pace abates a bit.


Now that OBL & Son are defunct, several items of a more important practical nature need to be reviewed. At the top of the list are Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The elimination of OBL is an opportunity for the US to declare victory in Afghanistan, saddle-up and move out. As I have always maintained, the surge advocated by General Petraeus and largely implemented by the US, was the wrong way to go. It has not been a success and since the original objective of the mission was to destroy al Qaida and take Afghanistan off the table as a safe base for jihadist training, the US and NATO have succeeded, it is time to leave. The mission was never to nation-build.

Furthermore, the mission to kill OBL deep inside Pakistan was undertaken by a small, elite team – not 35,000 or so boots on the ground. The justification for the surge appears to be based on the experience learned in Iraq. That was never a good idea considering the results in that ill-advised war. However, rather than indulging in the surge method of warfare (which always struck me as something you do when you’re on the ropes) or even COIN in Afghanistan the US should have focused on tracking and killing terrorists in Afghanistan with discrete and rapid missions, including from the air. That was V.P. Biden’s advice but because Petraeus was equivalent to Zeus by the Very Serious People in the Beltway, his advice absolutely had to be followed otherwise the world would end. So, the opportunity to agree with Karzai is sitting there like low hanging fruit. Pull out – and do it before the current target of 2014.

A rapid draw down in Afghanistan has a bag full of advantages, not the least of which is that it would save lives. And then there is the money. The budget deficit in the US would get some relief, particularly in combination with the withdrawal from Iraq. It would free-up the US military to actually pay attention to other areas of the world – or better yet – take a rest from patrolling the borders of the empire. It would swiftly cut short the messianic tinged nation-building endeavor into which the conflict has morphed. Not least, none of us would need to listen to the ungrateful whining of the corrupt Mayor of Kabul, Karzai.

Pakistan is a different issue. It is inconceivable that someone very high on the food chain in the Pakistan military or the ISI did not know that OBL was sipping Coke and Pepsi in a huge, multi-million dollar compound with 6 meter walls, close to the West Point of the country and the most fashionable golf course in the north - all 150 kilometers from the capital. How Pakistan is approached, however, will depend on the draw down in Afghanistan and what the US wants to accomplish in the region.

Pakistan is paranoid about India and Indian activities in Afghanistan. The generals see it as an encirclement campaign and will look to China and Iran for help. Pakistan is also beset by its local Taliban while opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan – for now. That may change as the US withdraws and Pakistan’s secret service decides the Afghan Taliban are useful. However, Iran loathes the Afghan Taliban for a variety of reasons – not the least of which is their particular brand of Islam. However, Pakistan’s military is still very reliant on US largess. Even as it becomes an economic and political basket case and becomes overall weaker compared to its heavy hitting neighbor India, the military will want their toys.

However, US foreign policy may be able to disenthrall itself regarding the perceived need to be nice to Pakistan and Afghanistan based on their fear mongering about al Qaeda. Given the swift insertion, action and withdrawal of a tightly organized team to kill OBL the US should wake up to the notion that it does not need Pakistan and Afghanistan as much as they led the US to believe – with significant help from the Republicans. The leverage this produces is huge. Back in the good old days (that’s a joke) when Kissinger and Nixon were around making trouble, Turkey’s generals were snubbing their collective noses at the US regarding missile deployment in Turkey. Kissinger, with considerable risk, basically said that the US clearly saw no reason to indulge the Turkish government if they did not want the help of the US. The same should be said of Pakistan and Afghanistan. What is more important in the region – India or Pakistan? In all of eastern and central Asia, does US foreign policy need to pander to the whims and blackmail of Islamabad, Kabul or, for that matter, Dushanbe and Bishkek?

The death of OBL, and the means of its accomplishment should provide US foreign policy with far more flexibility and allow it to focus on more important issues than the threats from some 3rd rate terrorists who have managed – again with the help of the Republicans – to get American citizens give up basic Constitutional liberties with every little radio and tape broadcast of meaningless threats. If anything, the al Qaeda central command (long gone and now decapitated) and all the little franchises have managed to show that many Americans are, quite simply, cowards and willing to give up all their democratic rights for security regardless of how remote the threat. As Benjamin Franklin said: They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.

So the killing of OBL opens up a range of opportunities for US foreign policy and withdrawal from Afghanistan will put Pakistan and Afghanistan on notice so they may adjust to a new world of interaction with their neighbors.

USAID Closes Down a Contractor

A little scandal in the development world is always fun – except for the people who are the cause of the scandal.

AED, it was reported in yesterday’s Washington Post, has been suspended from future USAID contracts while the Office of the Inspector General completes an investigation of the non-profit.  The Post reports that according to a statement from USAID, the initial findings by the inspector general's office "reveal evidence of serious corporate misconduct, mismanagement, and a lack of internal controls, and raise serious concerns of corporate integrity.  AED holds 65 contracts with USAID worth over $640 million. The article also points out that USAID said it decided to suspend AED after the inspector general's investigation started in spring 2009 and found "substantiated evidence of misconduct by AED.”  AED had to return money following an investigation into its Pakistan project.  AED also has significant contracts in Afghanistan. 

How much of the misconduct is related to shorting consultants and pocketing the difference?  the article does not say, but if you are in development, you know what I mean.  Example. Hotels can be expensive but if the organization tells the consultant that he or she can only bill for $100 per night and USAID allows up to $250 per night – what happens to the difference if the firm charges USAID the full permitted rate?

Now, this sort of thing has happened before.  I was once brought in to resurrect an organization where one or two staff (out of 15) had colluded with outsiders to fraudulently obtain about $185,000 during the previous two years and the OIG had shut down operations.  In that case, however, my organization had discovered the fraud, reported it to USAID, paid the money back, took responsibility for the sloppy internal financial management but USAID panicked, called in the OIG resulting in a further investigation that held up operations for another 9 months after the situation had been resolved. Nevertheless, this sort of thing happens.

The venerable Harvard University sponsored Russia development program back in the 990s was also involved in some shady practices through some subtle maneuvering by its senior person in the field.  They were found out and black-balled with ramifications all the way to the top at Harvard.

However, my question is, if this investigation started in 2009, why was AED just awarded a USAID contract in Ukraine – the kick-off of which is supposed to be on Monday, 13 December?  How on earth does USAID justify that?  By saying it’s a signed contract?  So what?  On what planet do they live?

Oh. And the CEO of AED reportedly earns close to or over $800 thousand a year. This is rumor, of course, but if true,  nice work in the Not-For-Profit universe for someone who doesn’t have to spend time in the field in the garden spots of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

India, Pakistan and Afghanistan - Obama in India

President Obama is in India. Pakistan is miffed. India considers an Afghanistan empty of US troops as a threat since it will revert to a land mass controlled from Islamabad through Pakistan’s security apparatus working with acceptable elements of the Taliban. Pakistan’s western border would then be reasonably secure allowing it to turn its attention to India and the Kashmir issue.
India is, to say the least, touchy about foreign intervention attempts at settling the Kashmir “problem”. As far as India is concerned, Kashmir is an internal security matter. As NATO and US presence begins to evaporate in Afghanistan, India has been inserting itself with development aid and establishing a foothold to maintain its leverage against Pakistan and prevent it from turning its attention to the east.
However, what possible alternatives are there to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a center of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist training if it is not a strong Pakistani presence? Islamabad is very familiar with the players and would not be inclined to accept the former Taliban regime from regaining anything close to its former level of power. They would likely support enough Taliban control to stabilize Afghanistan through traditional tribal deals and to create a status quo that resembles the Afghanistan of pre-Soviet times. This is what India will try to disrupt.
Is there a deal that can be brokered between India and Pakistan and can Obama do it. Frankly, I doubt it merely because Pakistan wants a settlement of the Kashmir issue, India does not except solely on its terms and the US has little leverage. Pakistan may want continued US support, but that won’t happen at the expense of India if only because of the economic element – Pakistan has little to offer while India controls a huge market that impacts US jobs and trade. There is also a little matter of balancing China’s growing influence.

Nevertheless, it is US foreign policy that can play the largest role in the sub-continent – no one even comes close. Obama visits Pakistan next year and will have a chance to smooth over the ruffled feathers in Islamabad. Afghanistan will be in full wind down. No one can afford a vacuum. The transfer of power to multiple parties in Afghanistan, including Karzai, the mayor of Kabul, needs to be arranged with security and stability in mind.
Unlike Iraq, where the US invasion and handling of the aftermath has resulted in the destruction of secularity and a gift of the entire country to Iran, the transition process in Afghanistan must carefully balance regional interests so that no one country ends up on top.

China Syndrome

Image via Wikipedia

Japan has ended its refueling mission in the Indian Ocean which was part of its support for the Afghan war. On the other side of the coin, this will be interesting from a foreign policy perspective if it comes to pass.

The Chinese navy is slowly extending its permanent blue water reach into new zones. Although ostensibly a mission merely to support the continuing war in Afghanistan (and therefore in support of the US military), this step really goes far beyond the naval mission against piracy that China has heretofore engaged. It creates a permanent presence. How this will play out with India, its regional rival, and Pakistan, its regional ally, if it actually happens?

On the other hand, will the US really, really agree to having its warships refueled by the Chinese? Somehow, it seems to me that this might be a sea lane too far.

Afghanistan Surge

The Obama plan is not what I would have hoped for since other than the July 2011 date to begin withdrawal there is no exit strategy. Perhaps there is one, but the strategy was not announced. To my mind, this was a necessary step in explaining the entire plan to the public. Now, however, and despite statements to the contrary, the withdrawal must really begin in the summer of 2011.

General McChrystal largely got what he wanted. The media, as usual, reported that the approved 30,000 was short of the troop surge that he had requested. He has more. The media conveniently forgot the 21,000 sent earlier this year. So, the US has committed another 51,000 and not 30,000. So be it and I really hope the general is correct in his assessment because he has 18 months to prove it.

If the troop withdrawal does not start in July 2011 then the surge will convert to an occupation in the eyes of the Afghans, something I would hope the US had learned to avoid from its ongoing experience in Iraq. This would be a mistake of enormous proportions because it would be seen that the US is supporting a corrupt regime in the face of an indigenous Pashtun uprising with an army made up of minority Tajiks.

Furthermore, Obama has stated that this is not a war of choice, but of necessity. Maybe - but I still wonder who we are fighting. That the Taliban are a despicable throw-back to twelfth century beliefs does not make them the enemy. Distasteful, oppressive and dangerous internally to Afghans - particularly women - they may be. But, the US cannot wage war on those grounds everywhere. So is the Mugabe regime, not to mention the proposed legislation in Uganda calling for the death penalty for homosexuals (supported, by the way, by the US homegrown Taliban known as the far right christian fundamentalists and their Republican allies).

If the purpose of the surge is to protect areas long enough to solidify opposition to the Taliban, then who is going to do that after the withdrawal? The Afghan army is composed largely of Tajiks who will have serious trouble operating in Pashtun majority areas. Indeed, it has taken 8 years to train 100,000 Afghan troops. Is the plan to train an equal number in 18 months even remotely feasible?

Is the goal to destroy al Qaida? It wouldn't seem necessary to employ 55,000 troops to go after a shattered organization which has not mounted a serious attack in 5 years. In any case, destroying the terrorist organization should not be the goal in Afghanistan not merely because its total destruction is likely impossible, but because the goal should be to deny it a base. Again, that does not take 55,000 troops.

The US has indulged in nation building in Iraq and is dangerously close to that goal in Afghanistan. This is the worst mistake since it is not a nation and only can be dealt with - if that's the phrase - as a collection of tribes and clans. The US cannot afford to stay in Afghanistan to cobble together a unified nation and certainly not with Karzai, the mayor of Kabul.

My take on this strategy is that there are too many points where it can fail ranging from the perception of occupation by foreigners to a corrupt, ineffective government that has lost legitimacy but which will attempt to keep the US in the game well beyond the 2011 withdrawal phase.

Beyond the borders of Afghanistan, the US and the surge will produce additional tensions between India and Pakistan. The latter have no desire to see Afghan Taliban, supported by the Pakistan government, pushed into Pakistan only to be followed in hot pursuit by troops or an increase in drone attacks. Pakistan is also concerned by Indian influence in Afghanistan and, paranoid or not, feels that India is encircling it.

Then there is Iran which seems to be involved in a slow motion drain circling dance internally but which also appears to be deliberately provoking the West. With troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, a belligerent Israel and an independent minded Turkey, how does Obama deal with a sudden Iran crisis? More importantly, how does he deal with the massive unemployment in the US while funding these military interventions.

I hope McChrystal is right and the Obama strategy works - at least to a certain extent - so that the US can declare it has done what it can do for Afghanistan, eliminated a base for al Qaida to operate within to train and launch attacks, and then leave.

Shocked, shocked...

Some things just don't need a comment:

From Reuters:

If it were in a position to do so, Al Qaeda would use Pakistan's nuclear weapons in its fight against the United States, a top leader of the group said in remarks aired Sunday.

Otherwise known as a BGO (blinding grasp of the obvious)

Failed State yet?

Today, Pakistan's President Zardari signed the Nizam-i-Adl, or System of Justice, Regulation into law following the approval of Parliament. Rarely does a democratically elected chamber approve of such a vile, anti-democratic regulation. But then, Pakistan is a failed state - or about to become one. One with nuclear weapon capability.

This obnoxious religious regulation arose from the cave-in by the provincial government of the North-West Frontier Province and the jihadist movement in the Swat region that calls for a shariah-based legal system to be implemented in the area in exchange for an end to the insurgency. That included laying down arms. Is it surprise that the arms were not surrendered?

So, what are the development agencies going to do now in Pakistan?