OBL and the Handwringers

The fatuous complaints by Osama bin Laden’s son, Omar, in the Paper of Record regarding the well-deserved killing of his father who not only admitted, but took pride in the murder of thousands in New York and thousands elsewhere deserve only derision and contempt.  As a New Yorker, Omar, I can only applaud what happened.  He was not executed and this was not an assassination and further, none of the action violated international law.  It’s bullet point time (pun intended) for Omar and  all the hand-wringers and New Germans out there as well as the amateur international law pundits and legal eagles at various human rights’ groups:

·         Assassination is defined as murder for political purposes. OBL was not a political figure. He was head of an organization that had been systematically killing thousands of people. 

·         OBL was head of a command and control apparatus of a paramilitary organization which was at war with a sovereign state. The killing of enemy military personnel in time of armed conflict is not assassination.

·         Over and above the fact that he got exactly what he deserved and the vast majority is happy he is dead (even in Pakistan), he was a lawful target under international law. The United Nations Charter firmly recognizes the right of a state to defend itself from attack. Bin Laden had demonstrated that he could and would attack the United States. He was also directing attacks against US troops in Afghanistan, who are there with UN sanction. He was doing this every day. Furthermore, Pakistani troops routinely invaded Afghanistan for purposes less urgent than self-defense in the 1990s.

·         The ICC has no jurisdiction. Period

·         The ICJ has no jurisdiction. Period

·         The UN would need a Security Council resolution to bring this to the attention of the ICC, which otherwise has no jurisdiction.  That’s about as likely as the Republican Party in the US doing something about oil companies and banksters.

So, Omar, crawl back under your luxury rock with your wealthy family in Riyadh or wherever in Saudi Arabia you live part time and allow us to forget you and your family name.

And while I’m on a roll – to everyone out there second and third guessing how the operation into Pakistan was planned and implemented and are now indulging in safely ludicrous discussions on international law, human rights’ issues and whether Pakistan’s sovereignty should have been breached, know this: You – all of you – know nothing about what went on in the back rooms or between the ISI, US military, GoP and CIA.  New reports in The Guardian firmly indicate that not only did the GoP know about what was happening, but had been approving incursions for the past decade. And that’s only the scratching the surface.

You also know nothing about the operation itself except what is being released because  it is none of your damn business and if you think there will ever be transparency in this type of operation then I have a bridge in Brooklyn I’d like to sell you. Idiots.

Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Death of bin Laden

If you’ve noticed a dearth of postings it’s because I’m busy with my day job. I’ll be posting more often once the frenetic pace abates a bit.


Now that OBL & Son are defunct, several items of a more important practical nature need to be reviewed. At the top of the list are Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The elimination of OBL is an opportunity for the US to declare victory in Afghanistan, saddle-up and move out. As I have always maintained, the surge advocated by General Petraeus and largely implemented by the US, was the wrong way to go. It has not been a success and since the original objective of the mission was to destroy al Qaida and take Afghanistan off the table as a safe base for jihadist training, the US and NATO have succeeded, it is time to leave. The mission was never to nation-build.

Furthermore, the mission to kill OBL deep inside Pakistan was undertaken by a small, elite team – not 35,000 or so boots on the ground. The justification for the surge appears to be based on the experience learned in Iraq. That was never a good idea considering the results in that ill-advised war. However, rather than indulging in the surge method of warfare (which always struck me as something you do when you’re on the ropes) or even COIN in Afghanistan the US should have focused on tracking and killing terrorists in Afghanistan with discrete and rapid missions, including from the air. That was V.P. Biden’s advice but because Petraeus was equivalent to Zeus by the Very Serious People in the Beltway, his advice absolutely had to be followed otherwise the world would end. So, the opportunity to agree with Karzai is sitting there like low hanging fruit. Pull out – and do it before the current target of 2014.

A rapid draw down in Afghanistan has a bag full of advantages, not the least of which is that it would save lives. And then there is the money. The budget deficit in the US would get some relief, particularly in combination with the withdrawal from Iraq. It would free-up the US military to actually pay attention to other areas of the world – or better yet – take a rest from patrolling the borders of the empire. It would swiftly cut short the messianic tinged nation-building endeavor into which the conflict has morphed. Not least, none of us would need to listen to the ungrateful whining of the corrupt Mayor of Kabul, Karzai.

Pakistan is a different issue. It is inconceivable that someone very high on the food chain in the Pakistan military or the ISI did not know that OBL was sipping Coke and Pepsi in a huge, multi-million dollar compound with 6 meter walls, close to the West Point of the country and the most fashionable golf course in the north - all 150 kilometers from the capital. How Pakistan is approached, however, will depend on the draw down in Afghanistan and what the US wants to accomplish in the region.

Pakistan is paranoid about India and Indian activities in Afghanistan. The generals see it as an encirclement campaign and will look to China and Iran for help. Pakistan is also beset by its local Taliban while opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan – for now. That may change as the US withdraws and Pakistan’s secret service decides the Afghan Taliban are useful. However, Iran loathes the Afghan Taliban for a variety of reasons – not the least of which is their particular brand of Islam. However, Pakistan’s military is still very reliant on US largess. Even as it becomes an economic and political basket case and becomes overall weaker compared to its heavy hitting neighbor India, the military will want their toys.

However, US foreign policy may be able to disenthrall itself regarding the perceived need to be nice to Pakistan and Afghanistan based on their fear mongering about al Qaeda. Given the swift insertion, action and withdrawal of a tightly organized team to kill OBL the US should wake up to the notion that it does not need Pakistan and Afghanistan as much as they led the US to believe – with significant help from the Republicans. The leverage this produces is huge. Back in the good old days (that’s a joke) when Kissinger and Nixon were around making trouble, Turkey’s generals were snubbing their collective noses at the US regarding missile deployment in Turkey. Kissinger, with considerable risk, basically said that the US clearly saw no reason to indulge the Turkish government if they did not want the help of the US. The same should be said of Pakistan and Afghanistan. What is more important in the region – India or Pakistan? In all of eastern and central Asia, does US foreign policy need to pander to the whims and blackmail of Islamabad, Kabul or, for that matter, Dushanbe and Bishkek?

The death of OBL, and the means of its accomplishment should provide US foreign policy with far more flexibility and allow it to focus on more important issues than the threats from some 3rd rate terrorists who have managed – again with the help of the Republicans – to get American citizens give up basic Constitutional liberties with every little radio and tape broadcast of meaningless threats. If anything, the al Qaeda central command (long gone and now decapitated) and all the little franchises have managed to show that many Americans are, quite simply, cowards and willing to give up all their democratic rights for security regardless of how remote the threat. As Benjamin Franklin said: They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.

So the killing of OBL opens up a range of opportunities for US foreign policy and withdrawal from Afghanistan will put Pakistan and Afghanistan on notice so they may adjust to a new world of interaction with their neighbors.

Afghanistan II - What's the Plan?

Image by Carl Montgomery via Flickr

The decision to invade Afghanistan was aimed at the destruction of Al Qaida as an effective force able to stage complex and large scale terrorist activities, deny it a secure base and simultaneously to drive the Taliban from power. Al Qaida has since been marginalized and since the invasion has been unable to mount any form of coordinated, serious attack against the US. They are no longer a threat to the US and no longer have a base of operations in Afghanistan such as existed under the protection of the Taliban.

The Taliban were driven from power by US and allied forces. There was no effective follow-thru and soon, the Repblican administration abandoned the hunt for Osama bin Laden and allowed the rural areas to become havens for the Taliban. The US is now paying the price for the misjudgements of the Bush administration in Afghanistan and the choice to turn its eye, efforts and money on Iraq.

The Taliban are resurgent and effective. The country is dangerously corrupt. Karzai is more the mayor of Kabul than president. The recent election was shot thru with fraud and after a recount, a new election is likely. General McChrystal's solution is a major troop surge of at least 40,000 while NATO allies have had enough and will send no more. They want an exit strategy. What alternatives does the new Obama administration have after inheriting a shattered foreign policy, shattered economic policy at home and questionable support from NATO allies?

First, there is the McChrystal alternative. It is not surprising for the general in charge to see the effects of more than six years of indifference to the mission and ask for more troops. But will more boots on the ground really make a difference? That is highly unlikely. The Taliban know that the US will not be in place forever and they can afford to wait. The US treasury cannot continue to absorb endless wars, whether justified or not. And the US cannot continue to sacrifice its military on what very well may be an unwinable war in the conventional sense. Historically there would be no precedent for military victory.

However, putting an additional 40,000 troops into Afghanistan will smack of an occupation. More troops is not better. In fact, it will antagonize the Afghans and serve as a rallying cry for the Taliban. Far more effective would be highly trained special forces that are used to pinpoint targets and terrorist bases to disrupt and destroy Taliban operations. Coupled with an effort to make sure that aid is meaningful - rebuilding infrastructure for example - would go a long way to removing the attraction of the Taliban and deflate any propaganda characterizing the war as an occupation.

Second, the Obama administration has already dialed down the effort to eradicate opium poppy production. This was a misguided effort as all it did was drive poor farmers into the hands of the Taliban. Opium growing accounts for a third of the Afghan economy. No substitute was offered and destruction of the fields meant destruction of the family. It was a foolish policy and the Obama administraton should continue its targeted opium field destruction policy while significantly raising the level of effort to give farmers alternatives so they and their families don't have to choose between starvation and the Taliban.

Third, and most importantly, it is clear that somewhere in 2005 - 2006 the US slowly slipped into a nation-building mission. This was a huge error and needs to be rapidly reversed.

Afghanistan has never been a nation - so there is nothing to rebuild - and the US should not be in that business. Nation building requires the assent of the population and they must do it themselves. The Bush administration indulged in an alarming tendency to lecture other nations and peoples. How has that worked out? It is absurd to believe that anything the US does can result in a viable, cohesive Afghanistan when its entire history is one of tribal rivalry which only seems to come together when a foreign presence descends on Herat or Kabul be it Persia, the Mongols, England, Russia or the US. It is truly the 'graveyard of empires'. None have succeeded. None.

The choices facing the Obama administration are stark and not of its making. Eight years of mismanagement and myth building will not be fixed quickly. President Obama must ignore the conventional wisdom that permeates the Washington village. It has been consistently and deadly wrong for eight years - and not just in Afghanistan.

Everyone wants success but is unable to define it. Richard Holbrook defined success as "knowing it when we see it". Really? What are the goals? Who exactly, is the enemy? I respect Ambassador Holbrook enormously, but I certainly hope that "we'll know it when we see it" is not the definition of success being adopted by this administration. The US needs an exit strategy - an end game - and not one for a long-term engagement with significant military forces.

The internal political problems that the Obama administration faces regarding Afghanistan are one of "damned if you do and damned if you don't". It is abundantly clear that the Republican opposition is not interested in engagement and debate and is simply going to try and tear down, obstruct and damage this administration in any way possible, including fear, obfuscation and outright lies. They will need to be steamrolled. Period.

Granting General McChrystal the troops he claims is necessary for victory - or at least to stabilize the situation - is not necessarilly what is needed. Again, a significantly larger military footpring will achieve the opposite effect with the population. Additional troops of this magnitude will make it impossible to disangage and will be used to justify more troops and money. It has happened before and is a disease that seems to infect American foreign policy.

Fewer troops with a narrow mission of containing and destroying Al Qaida is much more practical than a massive ground war against the Taliban. At the same time,the United States should increase international assistance to Afghanistan under UN supervision. The aid should target the creation of sustainable development, particularly in rural areas. Furthermore, continuing to target opium producers directly tied to the Taliban is a viable policy while providing income-producing alternatives to all the rest would reduce the growing antipathy toward the US.

The Obama administration needs to brush aside the wise old men who pontificate every Sunday on television and in the rapidly shrinking print media who suggest that if only the US had enough troops and enough time, we could build a nation. The US could stay in Afghanistan for a thousand years and it would not achieve its definition of success if the definition is the creation of some sort of Jeffersonian democracy.

Next, I want to discuss the larger picture. Iran, Russia, Europe and Israel.

Afghanistan I

Image via Wikipedia

US involvement in Afghanistan recently passed its eighth anniversary. As President Obama has said, this was not a war of choice for the US. The question is, what has it become and where is the US going.

Briefly, in 2001 when the US invasion began, the goal was to destroy safe havens for terrorists which were under the protection of the ruling Taliban. The Taliban were targeted too since their rule had facilitated al Qaida training camps and they refused to turn over Osama bin Laden claiming he was a guest. The Bush administration publicly made the mission one of destroying the Taliban and capturing or killing bin Laden. Neither goal, obviously was met while the mission drifted until the Bush administration clearly abandoned the search for the man behind the death of 3,000 American, British, Iranian, French and other nationalities at the World Trade Center.

The Taliban collapsed outwardly rather quickly, being unable to challenge US and US supported troops in the field. Having utter control in the air, the US and its Afghan allies rapidly rolled up territory and simply drove into Kabul. What happened next was a series of misplaced priorities and actions.

First, US strategy relied on high altitude bombing which resulted in high civilian casualty counts. Not the way to win over the population to the cause. Small scale anti-terrorist operations may have been more effective and resulted in fewer civilian deaths while offering a better chance of capturing or killing the most wanted criminal - up to that point - for the US. The Bush administration then handed over power to the military warlords and Islamisists who had support the US campaign.

Even when Karzai came to power and tried to curb the power of the warlords, the US continued its support because of the perceived necessity of using them to root out al Qaida and Taliban elements. Unfortunately as well, the US did not seek to internationalize the effort by asking for European - and especially troops from Muslim countries - to join as part of a coalition at that time.

Without an effort to build security beyond Kabul, the stage was set for a Taliban resurgence - which began three years ago as the effects of the war of choice in Iraq sucked down US troops, attention and treasury. By 2005 the US poured in half a trillion dollars into Iraq and during the previous two years slashed reconstruction aid to the Karzai government by 30%. By 2005, even the aid provided was not going to the Afghan people (and those of us in the development business know exactly how US foreign aid operates). Action Aid estimated at the time that only 14% of all aid goes to real development project. I know some of the people who were in Afghanistan - the 50% of development aid funding that went to these dubiously qualified consultants to be spent on questionable US products was a joke. At that time Karzai was justified in his harsh criticism of all foreign aid - and especially that from the US. Karzai was fiercely critical of the Bush policies even in 2005. Indeed, the US spent more on bombing Afghanistan than rebuilding it.

The failures that were self-evident in 2005 and widely discussed, except as is ever the case to ardent supporters of Bush and Cheney and the neo-con leadership, were largely the result of the diversion of resources to Iraq. An Afghanistan policy review took place in 2005 and progress there was widely praised by the Bush administration. Yet, the Afghanistan operation remained an unfinished effort, faded from the ever vigilant US media. The focus in Afghanistan was completely lost after the Tora Bora operation that failed to capture or kill the primary target of the US, Osama bin Laden. Then, specialized elements of the US Army assigned to track him down were withdrawn in 2002 for the preparations against Iraq.

The Obama administration has said that it has completed its deliberations on a policy direction for the US in Afghanistan which will also determine the number of "surge" troops demanded by General McChrystal. Where and how the US directs its efforts at this point is critical. This administration needs to get it right and not follow the knee jerk crazies in the Republican Limbaugh Party - who, by the way, don't serve in any capacity in Afghanistan but who are very willing and eager to watch other peoples' children die.

The next post will discuss some myths that prevail about Afghanistan and posit a way forward - if the administration does not make the post moot. I will also review the larger picture of the changed foreign policy strategy of the Obama administration and the effect on Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran.

Afghanistan Fast Forward

For the past eight years, the US has been fighting in and supplying technical assistance to Afghanistan.

The focus of the current debate is whether to send significantly more troops - General McChrystal wants 40,000 - as the only alternative to "win" the war. President Obama, the Pentagon and the State Department, among others, are slowly developing a plan - something that has been lacking - regarding the way forward. But, before determining the size of the military presence, President Obama needs to explain the goal.

The goal used to be the destruction of al-Qaida and the capture of Osama bin Laden. Then the focus changed, particularly with the preparations for the war-of-choice of the Bush-Cheney administration to invade Iraq which had no connection whatsoever to the attacks by al-Qaidi in New York and Washington. The preparatioins for the Iraq war can be directly linked to the failures in Afghanistan which were well documented by 2005 and with which the US must deal with in expanded form now.

In subsequent posts I want to examine where we have been and where we may be going in Afghanistan and some of the assumtions that underlie many policies undertaken by the US that may well be very wrong.