Good News Bad News - Afghanistan and the West Bank

Some time ago I offered my opinion of the,then, proposed surge in Afghanistan - the request by General McChrystal for a significant increase in troop deployment. He got 30,000 (the media seems to continue to ignore the previous deployment of 12,000 earlier in 2009 making the total over 40,000 so I will too for now).

The Republicans, of course, stamped their collective hooves saying the General should get whatever he feels is necessary for prosecution of the war. Fortunately, the grown-ups decided to actually think about future strategy rather than allowing the military to dictate to the civilians in control (a source of frequent confusion to those in perpetual opposition to anything). Well, what will all those Republicans say now to this (registration required).

For those who can't access the article in the Financial Times here is a key part:

“As a soldier, my personal feeling is that there’s been enough fighting,” he said. “What I think we do is try to shape conditions which allow people to come to a truly equitable solution to how the Afghan people are governed.”

Asked if he would be content to see Taliban leaders in a future government in Kabul, he said: “I think any Afghans can play a role if they focus on the future, and not the past.”

The remarks reveal the growing faith the US military is placing in the hope that a power-sharing arrangement can end the war, a possibility floated in Islamabad last week by Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, when he described the Taliban as part of Afghanistan’s “political fabric”.

The coming conference in London to discuss strategy will be a crucial meeting for NATO. Europe wants a definite exit strategy and the US has already issued a deadline to President Karzai. Although I did not agree with the surge, now that it is in place arguing about its usefulness is moot. General McChrystal has also tied his credibility to the request to support his plan, so he has much at stake. But, it is his sentiments expressed that I find most telling. It should really upset the Republicans. Good.

Now, juxtapose his statements with those of The Worst Israeli President Ever while planting a tree in the West Bank:

"Our message is clear: We are planting here, we will stay here, we will build here. This place will be an inseparable part of Israel for eternity".

Eternity, Mr. Netanyahu, is a lot longer than you will be in charge. Not helpful at all and is only a further example of the extremist positions taken by the current regime in Israel that really began manifesting itself with the childish incident of the low chair for the Turkish ambassador. Well, people usual get the government they deserve.

Afghanistan Surge

The Obama plan is not what I would have hoped for since other than the July 2011 date to begin withdrawal there is no exit strategy. Perhaps there is one, but the strategy was not announced. To my mind, this was a necessary step in explaining the entire plan to the public. Now, however, and despite statements to the contrary, the withdrawal must really begin in the summer of 2011.

General McChrystal largely got what he wanted. The media, as usual, reported that the approved 30,000 was short of the troop surge that he had requested. He has more. The media conveniently forgot the 21,000 sent earlier this year. So, the US has committed another 51,000 and not 30,000. So be it and I really hope the general is correct in his assessment because he has 18 months to prove it.

If the troop withdrawal does not start in July 2011 then the surge will convert to an occupation in the eyes of the Afghans, something I would hope the US had learned to avoid from its ongoing experience in Iraq. This would be a mistake of enormous proportions because it would be seen that the US is supporting a corrupt regime in the face of an indigenous Pashtun uprising with an army made up of minority Tajiks.

Furthermore, Obama has stated that this is not a war of choice, but of necessity. Maybe - but I still wonder who we are fighting. That the Taliban are a despicable throw-back to twelfth century beliefs does not make them the enemy. Distasteful, oppressive and dangerous internally to Afghans - particularly women - they may be. But, the US cannot wage war on those grounds everywhere. So is the Mugabe regime, not to mention the proposed legislation in Uganda calling for the death penalty for homosexuals (supported, by the way, by the US homegrown Taliban known as the far right christian fundamentalists and their Republican allies).

If the purpose of the surge is to protect areas long enough to solidify opposition to the Taliban, then who is going to do that after the withdrawal? The Afghan army is composed largely of Tajiks who will have serious trouble operating in Pashtun majority areas. Indeed, it has taken 8 years to train 100,000 Afghan troops. Is the plan to train an equal number in 18 months even remotely feasible?

Is the goal to destroy al Qaida? It wouldn't seem necessary to employ 55,000 troops to go after a shattered organization which has not mounted a serious attack in 5 years. In any case, destroying the terrorist organization should not be the goal in Afghanistan not merely because its total destruction is likely impossible, but because the goal should be to deny it a base. Again, that does not take 55,000 troops.

The US has indulged in nation building in Iraq and is dangerously close to that goal in Afghanistan. This is the worst mistake since it is not a nation and only can be dealt with - if that's the phrase - as a collection of tribes and clans. The US cannot afford to stay in Afghanistan to cobble together a unified nation and certainly not with Karzai, the mayor of Kabul.

My take on this strategy is that there are too many points where it can fail ranging from the perception of occupation by foreigners to a corrupt, ineffective government that has lost legitimacy but which will attempt to keep the US in the game well beyond the 2011 withdrawal phase.

Beyond the borders of Afghanistan, the US and the surge will produce additional tensions between India and Pakistan. The latter have no desire to see Afghan Taliban, supported by the Pakistan government, pushed into Pakistan only to be followed in hot pursuit by troops or an increase in drone attacks. Pakistan is also concerned by Indian influence in Afghanistan and, paranoid or not, feels that India is encircling it.

Then there is Iran which seems to be involved in a slow motion drain circling dance internally but which also appears to be deliberately provoking the West. With troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, a belligerent Israel and an independent minded Turkey, how does Obama deal with a sudden Iran crisis? More importantly, how does he deal with the massive unemployment in the US while funding these military interventions.

I hope McChrystal is right and the Obama strategy works - at least to a certain extent - so that the US can declare it has done what it can do for Afghanistan, eliminated a base for al Qaida to operate within to train and launch attacks, and then leave.

Afghan Rumours

McClatchy reports that the Obama adminstration is hinting at the deployment of 34,000 more troops to Afghanistan - very close to the number requested by General McChrystal as a minimum and which I thought was delusional.

If this is true, then I believe it is a huge mistake. The Biden approach is much more doable than spending a huge amount of funds on a questionable deployment to support a corrupt government of a non-nation which has shown no signs of reforming. The final decision won't come until after the President finishes with his Asia trip, but a plan has yet to be articulated.

I despise people like the Taliban - but are they a threat to US interests within Afghanistan (they are different than the Pakistanian version)? Why isn't it possible to maintain a force that can surgically target threats? What is the US goal? Is there an exit strategy?

Afghanistan II - What's the Plan?

Image by Carl Montgomery via Flickr

The decision to invade Afghanistan was aimed at the destruction of Al Qaida as an effective force able to stage complex and large scale terrorist activities, deny it a secure base and simultaneously to drive the Taliban from power. Al Qaida has since been marginalized and since the invasion has been unable to mount any form of coordinated, serious attack against the US. They are no longer a threat to the US and no longer have a base of operations in Afghanistan such as existed under the protection of the Taliban.

The Taliban were driven from power by US and allied forces. There was no effective follow-thru and soon, the Repblican administration abandoned the hunt for Osama bin Laden and allowed the rural areas to become havens for the Taliban. The US is now paying the price for the misjudgements of the Bush administration in Afghanistan and the choice to turn its eye, efforts and money on Iraq.

The Taliban are resurgent and effective. The country is dangerously corrupt. Karzai is more the mayor of Kabul than president. The recent election was shot thru with fraud and after a recount, a new election is likely. General McChrystal's solution is a major troop surge of at least 40,000 while NATO allies have had enough and will send no more. They want an exit strategy. What alternatives does the new Obama administration have after inheriting a shattered foreign policy, shattered economic policy at home and questionable support from NATO allies?

First, there is the McChrystal alternative. It is not surprising for the general in charge to see the effects of more than six years of indifference to the mission and ask for more troops. But will more boots on the ground really make a difference? That is highly unlikely. The Taliban know that the US will not be in place forever and they can afford to wait. The US treasury cannot continue to absorb endless wars, whether justified or not. And the US cannot continue to sacrifice its military on what very well may be an unwinable war in the conventional sense. Historically there would be no precedent for military victory.

However, putting an additional 40,000 troops into Afghanistan will smack of an occupation. More troops is not better. In fact, it will antagonize the Afghans and serve as a rallying cry for the Taliban. Far more effective would be highly trained special forces that are used to pinpoint targets and terrorist bases to disrupt and destroy Taliban operations. Coupled with an effort to make sure that aid is meaningful - rebuilding infrastructure for example - would go a long way to removing the attraction of the Taliban and deflate any propaganda characterizing the war as an occupation.

Second, the Obama administration has already dialed down the effort to eradicate opium poppy production. This was a misguided effort as all it did was drive poor farmers into the hands of the Taliban. Opium growing accounts for a third of the Afghan economy. No substitute was offered and destruction of the fields meant destruction of the family. It was a foolish policy and the Obama administraton should continue its targeted opium field destruction policy while significantly raising the level of effort to give farmers alternatives so they and their families don't have to choose between starvation and the Taliban.

Third, and most importantly, it is clear that somewhere in 2005 - 2006 the US slowly slipped into a nation-building mission. This was a huge error and needs to be rapidly reversed.

Afghanistan has never been a nation - so there is nothing to rebuild - and the US should not be in that business. Nation building requires the assent of the population and they must do it themselves. The Bush administration indulged in an alarming tendency to lecture other nations and peoples. How has that worked out? It is absurd to believe that anything the US does can result in a viable, cohesive Afghanistan when its entire history is one of tribal rivalry which only seems to come together when a foreign presence descends on Herat or Kabul be it Persia, the Mongols, England, Russia or the US. It is truly the 'graveyard of empires'. None have succeeded. None.

The choices facing the Obama administration are stark and not of its making. Eight years of mismanagement and myth building will not be fixed quickly. President Obama must ignore the conventional wisdom that permeates the Washington village. It has been consistently and deadly wrong for eight years - and not just in Afghanistan.

Everyone wants success but is unable to define it. Richard Holbrook defined success as "knowing it when we see it". Really? What are the goals? Who exactly, is the enemy? I respect Ambassador Holbrook enormously, but I certainly hope that "we'll know it when we see it" is not the definition of success being adopted by this administration. The US needs an exit strategy - an end game - and not one for a long-term engagement with significant military forces.

The internal political problems that the Obama administration faces regarding Afghanistan are one of "damned if you do and damned if you don't". It is abundantly clear that the Republican opposition is not interested in engagement and debate and is simply going to try and tear down, obstruct and damage this administration in any way possible, including fear, obfuscation and outright lies. They will need to be steamrolled. Period.

Granting General McChrystal the troops he claims is necessary for victory - or at least to stabilize the situation - is not necessarilly what is needed. Again, a significantly larger military footpring will achieve the opposite effect with the population. Additional troops of this magnitude will make it impossible to disangage and will be used to justify more troops and money. It has happened before and is a disease that seems to infect American foreign policy.

Fewer troops with a narrow mission of containing and destroying Al Qaida is much more practical than a massive ground war against the Taliban. At the same time,the United States should increase international assistance to Afghanistan under UN supervision. The aid should target the creation of sustainable development, particularly in rural areas. Furthermore, continuing to target opium producers directly tied to the Taliban is a viable policy while providing income-producing alternatives to all the rest would reduce the growing antipathy toward the US.

The Obama administration needs to brush aside the wise old men who pontificate every Sunday on television and in the rapidly shrinking print media who suggest that if only the US had enough troops and enough time, we could build a nation. The US could stay in Afghanistan for a thousand years and it would not achieve its definition of success if the definition is the creation of some sort of Jeffersonian democracy.

Next, I want to discuss the larger picture. Iran, Russia, Europe and Israel.

Afghanistan I

Image via Wikipedia

US involvement in Afghanistan recently passed its eighth anniversary. As President Obama has said, this was not a war of choice for the US. The question is, what has it become and where is the US going.

Briefly, in 2001 when the US invasion began, the goal was to destroy safe havens for terrorists which were under the protection of the ruling Taliban. The Taliban were targeted too since their rule had facilitated al Qaida training camps and they refused to turn over Osama bin Laden claiming he was a guest. The Bush administration publicly made the mission one of destroying the Taliban and capturing or killing bin Laden. Neither goal, obviously was met while the mission drifted until the Bush administration clearly abandoned the search for the man behind the death of 3,000 American, British, Iranian, French and other nationalities at the World Trade Center.

The Taliban collapsed outwardly rather quickly, being unable to challenge US and US supported troops in the field. Having utter control in the air, the US and its Afghan allies rapidly rolled up territory and simply drove into Kabul. What happened next was a series of misplaced priorities and actions.

First, US strategy relied on high altitude bombing which resulted in high civilian casualty counts. Not the way to win over the population to the cause. Small scale anti-terrorist operations may have been more effective and resulted in fewer civilian deaths while offering a better chance of capturing or killing the most wanted criminal - up to that point - for the US. The Bush administration then handed over power to the military warlords and Islamisists who had support the US campaign.

Even when Karzai came to power and tried to curb the power of the warlords, the US continued its support because of the perceived necessity of using them to root out al Qaida and Taliban elements. Unfortunately as well, the US did not seek to internationalize the effort by asking for European - and especially troops from Muslim countries - to join as part of a coalition at that time.

Without an effort to build security beyond Kabul, the stage was set for a Taliban resurgence - which began three years ago as the effects of the war of choice in Iraq sucked down US troops, attention and treasury. By 2005 the US poured in half a trillion dollars into Iraq and during the previous two years slashed reconstruction aid to the Karzai government by 30%. By 2005, even the aid provided was not going to the Afghan people (and those of us in the development business know exactly how US foreign aid operates). Action Aid estimated at the time that only 14% of all aid goes to real development project. I know some of the people who were in Afghanistan - the 50% of development aid funding that went to these dubiously qualified consultants to be spent on questionable US products was a joke. At that time Karzai was justified in his harsh criticism of all foreign aid - and especially that from the US. Karzai was fiercely critical of the Bush policies even in 2005. Indeed, the US spent more on bombing Afghanistan than rebuilding it.

The failures that were self-evident in 2005 and widely discussed, except as is ever the case to ardent supporters of Bush and Cheney and the neo-con leadership, were largely the result of the diversion of resources to Iraq. An Afghanistan policy review took place in 2005 and progress there was widely praised by the Bush administration. Yet, the Afghanistan operation remained an unfinished effort, faded from the ever vigilant US media. The focus in Afghanistan was completely lost after the Tora Bora operation that failed to capture or kill the primary target of the US, Osama bin Laden. Then, specialized elements of the US Army assigned to track him down were withdrawn in 2002 for the preparations against Iraq.

The Obama administration has said that it has completed its deliberations on a policy direction for the US in Afghanistan which will also determine the number of "surge" troops demanded by General McChrystal. Where and how the US directs its efforts at this point is critical. This administration needs to get it right and not follow the knee jerk crazies in the Republican Limbaugh Party - who, by the way, don't serve in any capacity in Afghanistan but who are very willing and eager to watch other peoples' children die.

The next post will discuss some myths that prevail about Afghanistan and posit a way forward - if the administration does not make the post moot. I will also review the larger picture of the changed foreign policy strategy of the Obama administration and the effect on Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran.

Obama Wins Nobel Peace Prize

Good.

And I am very happy that the Republican Party has finally found its natural allies who were equally critical of the award to the President: Hamas, the Taliban and Iran.